

The Seattle Police Department After Action Report

World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference
Seattle, Washington
November 29 – December 3, 1999

Prepared by:
The Seattle Police Department
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Transmittal

This document is transmitted this date, April 4, 2000, from Assistant Chief Clark Kimerer, commander of the Seattle Police Department WTO After Action Report team, to Chief Herbert V. Johnson. The WTO-AAR team was lead by Captain Linda Pierce and staffed by Lieutenants Ted Jacoby and Steve Brown, Senior Planner Mike Quinn, and Graphics Designer Shanna Christie. Captain Jim Pryor was special topics coordinator. Other contributors included Sergeant Scott Bachler, Officers Kevin Grossman, Christie-Lynne Bonner, and Mark Mulvanny, and Department Legal Advisor Leo Poort.

Introduction

This document presents the **Seattle Police Department (SPD) After Action Report for the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference** held in Seattle between November 29 and December 3, 1999. While it is recognized that many other groups and agencies may be interested in this report, this document is intended as an After Action Report for the Seattle Police Department.

As such, it conforms to professional standards for reports of this kind. This report does not represent the views of other City agencies or of the numerous allied police agencies that supported the Department during the Conference. The discussion that follows is limited in scope to those issues over which the Department had final authority. Although not all-inclusive, it is comprehensive in the sense that it addresses WTO security plans and the operational dynamics that evolved as the plan was executed. Actions of particular individuals, sworn or otherwise, are referenced only when those actions had broad operational implications.

This WTO After Action Report is organized into four major sections, followed by appendices that provide added detail. These four sections are as follows:

- **Background:** provides a brief introduction to the events, and the sponsoring groups, that brought the WTO Ministerial Conference to Seattle.
- **Planning Process:** provides a full description of the development of multiple plans that were required to support the Conference, with attention to planning processes and participants and well as the substance of those plans.
- **Operations Summary:** provides a detailed chronology and description of security operations during the week of the Conference.
- **Lessons Learned:** provides an objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the plans and the execution of those plans, with a view toward improved performance in future operations.

Executive Summary

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference held in Seattle between November 29 and December 3, 1999 confronted the Seattle Police Department (SPD) with civil unrest the likes of which has not been seen in the city for many years. **The planning and tactics employed by forces intent on “shutting down the WTO” may come to be recognized as a watershed event for disruptive protest in the new millennium, an event that established the model and standard for similar events in years to come. For this reason, this after action report will be of considerable interest to law enforcement agencies throughout the nation and the world.**

It would be easy and self-serving to list the numerous factors that made the WTO Conference a very difficult assignment for the Department and conclude that it was a “mission impossible.” But this report must not be regarded as an assembly of self-serving defenses; rather, it is intended to be a professional, candid, and sometimes painful review of the facts, to learn how we can do a better job in the future. This report identifies weaknesses in planning and execution that must be addressed in preparing for similar operations in the future, as well as some things which worked well and should be sustained in future operations.

Summary Operations Assessment

Overall, considering the history, the complexity, and the intensity of the WTO Ministerial event, the Seattle Police Department and its allied agency (mutual aid) partners performed commendably during the WTO Conference. The professionalism and restraint displayed by the police officers, supervisors, and commanders on the “front line,” whether posted at venues or assigned to demonstration management or escort duty, was nothing short of outstanding. This review of the WTO event found nothing to rival this single point: without the remarkable poise and performance of front line officers and their supervisors, the WTO Conference event could have concluded far differently than it did. After a start delayed by security concerns in the Convention Center, WTO delegates were able to meet and deliberate, protesters were able to express their views, there were no deaths or serious injuries, and only 92 individuals were seen for mostly minor injuries at area hospitals¹. All of this was achieved in spite of the riotous behavior that threatened to stop the event on Tuesday and Wednesday, November 30-December 1, 1999.

Within this context, SPD acknowledges that, tactically, it was taught a hard lesson by a well-trained and equipped adversary. Despite a dedicated effort to plan for contingencies, the events of November 30 established that the

¹ According to the records of the Seattle Fire Department.

Department's initial planning and staffing were inadequate for handling the situation that confronted the city. Throughout that day, the night, and the day following, SPD and its mutual aid allies fought for control of the streets in the Downtown core and on nearby Capitol Hill. By December 2, order had been restored and there were no further major disruptions.

Lessons Learned: Weaknesses

In examining the planning and execution phases of the WTO Conference event, SPD found numerous weaknesses that will need to be addressed in preparing for similar events in the future.

Assessment of the Situation

Much has been made of the work of the Intelligence Subcommittee, an interagency group designed to gather information and assess any threats to the peaceful conduct of the WTO Conference. As discussed in the body of the report, in addition to the problematic character inherent in all intelligence work, the City's Investigations Ordinance complicated and slowed the work of the subcommittee. In spite of this difficulty, SPD commanders received credible information of a serious threat to the Conference. Received just three weeks prior to the event, SPD commanders did what they could to recruit allied agency support and adjust SPD staffing to address the threat, especially by organizing a small "flying squad" to single out law breakers for arrest and quick removal from the area. As documented in the report, however, this squad was never employed as intended.

In retrospect, SPD commanders put their faith in historical precedent – the Seattle tradition of peaceful protest – in assessing the needs for policing the WTO event. While we needed to think about a new paradigm of disruptive protest, we relied on our knowledge of past demonstrations, concluding that the "worst case" would not occur here.

In trying to understand our experience with the WTO, it is important to note that the initial assumptions made regarding the Conference were predicated on the Department's 1993 experience with the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference. This was a reasonable premise. Both APEC and WTO involved economic trade and justice issues. Both were high profile events, even though it was uncertain whether heads of state would attend WTO in any numbers, as they did for the APEC Conference. Most important of all, SPD experience with APEC was a resounding success, and the Department has had a long record of successes with high profile events (e.g., the Goodwill Games). In the final analysis, SPD planners concluded that the WTO would either be a smaller event, if heads of state did not attend in any significant numbers, or a much larger event if the contrary proved true.

During the summer months, as intelligence began to intimate that the WTO might occasion significant protest and demonstrations, SPD did respond as detailed in the report by strengthening its demonstration management capabilities. However, our general theory did not change: Seattle has enjoyed a history of peaceful protest; Seattleites do not deface the places where they live and work; and SPD can handle potential disruptions with existing resources.

Some might well ask, nevertheless, with the media coverage of the Arlington training site used by those planning to disrupt the meetings, how SPD could not have been aware of the new paradigm of disruptive protest? While it is true that the Department did learn something of the tactics it might expect to face, nothing in the long experience of the Department's leadership could have prepared it for the commitment, organization, and tactical sophistication that it faced in the comparatively small number of organizers who were bent on disrupting the WTO Conference.² Among other things, WTO commanders were surprised by the high degree of coordinated action orchestrated using walkie talkies and cell phones; the critical mass achieved with the rapid marshalling of forces from all directions nearly simultaneously on the morning of November 30; the conscious use of hit and run tactics and flanking movements through the day and night to follow; and the effective use of peaceful demonstrators to mask and shield law violators.

In summary, the Department's planning assumptions and analysis underestimated the capability of criminally disruptive forces. This after action report recommends that the City undertake a careful assessment of the effects of its Investigations Ordinance and that SPD commanders include a credible worst case scenario in planning for future events.

Contingency Planning

Without a realistic assessment of the situation, and with precious little time remaining before the Conference was to begin, SPD did not prepare detailed plans to address all contingencies in sufficient depth. As noted above, the most obvious shortfall was a detailed plan for "worst case." For example, and most urgently, SPD did not plan to staff its Demonstration Management platoons after 2200 hours, except through a group comprised of on-duty 911 patrol officers. In addition, while a plan for invoking mutual aid was prepared, there was insufficient attention to the allocation of specific responsibilities ahead of time. As a result, some arriving contingents from mutual aid jurisdictions had to wait idly on the fringes of the WTO area of operations for SPD to determine where and how to deploy them.

² A leader of one of the WTO protest groups is quoted as saying: "To use Seattle as our yardstick is to doom ourselves to failure. . . . Seattle was an incredible confluence of events, campaigns, timing, and organization" (U.S. New & World Report, April 3, 2000, p.24).

SPD had a written contingency plan for re-supply of chemical agents (CS gas). However, some Chemical Agent Response (CART) Teams ran low of preferred munitions and relied on allied agencies for supply until shipments arrived. Additional supplies arrived before any CART Team “ran out” of CS gas munitions. Many officers, however, did exhaust their personal protective OC pepper spray, and there was no written contingency for field replacement of OC spray. These personal OC munitions were never intended to serve as crowd dispersal agents.

Although the WTO Planning Unit did a remarkable job with the time and resources available, logging some 11,600 hours on planning with a very small team, insufficient depth and detailing of contingency plans represents a serious flaw the responsibility for which must ultimately be borne by senior commanders. This after action report recommends preparation of detailed contingency plans to support future operations. In addition, the establishment of a permanent Major Event Planning Unit in the new Special Operations Bureau of SPD is intended to provide an ongoing source of institutional memory and organizational expertise for future undertakings of this kind.

Operational Control

An essential element for the successful execution of any plan is the ability to control operations once officers are deployed. Unfortunately, in several respects the command and control arrangements for WTO broke down early during the operation. Most notably, the SPD Incident Commander in the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) did not know with certainty in near real time who was where and what was happening on the ground. This made it very difficult to maintain effective control from the SPOC.

On the ground, the field Incident Commander for the Demonstration Management platoons was similarly hampered by a too-wide span of control aggravated by the absence of sufficient field support to help control and orchestrate actions on the “front lines.” As a result, platoon commanders were frequently required to make decisions on their own. In the most critical of these instances, the “flying squad” redeployed to the Convention Center on the morning of November 30th. Without this unit to arrest key law breakers, SPD missed a crucial opportunity to remove the leadership of the unlawful disruptive element early on the first day of the WTO.

With regard to integrating allied mutual aid agencies into the scheme of maneuver, the lack of radios with compatible frequencies greatly hampered the ability of the SPOC to provide missions and adjust the efforts of allied forces once they were deployed.

To keep this discussion in perspective, it is important to note that SPD gets few opportunities to train and practice execution of special events of the scope and complexity of the WTO Conference. SPD has superb police officers who are highly skilled and effective when operating independently or in small teams; the Department has less experience designing and executing operations where officers are organized into platoon and company-sized formations, as was the case with WTO. The need to integrate allied agencies into the operation merely added to the complexity and difficulty of the task.

To address these critical flaws in command and control, this after action report recommends regular training and exercising of the SPOC and the Incident Command System to orchestrate public safety efforts for large special events.

Logistics

The after action report calls attention to a number of logistical shortfalls observed during the WTO deployment. Most significant, all officers did not have the full array of personal protective equipment required for handling a riot. Many officers did not receive food and water in a timely fashion. Lacking a separate frequency for logistics, it was difficult to get requests for resupply through heavy radio traffic on the Department's operations frequency. It also was difficult to get appropriate transportation to move officers from one venue to another.

The after action report makes specific recommendations to address these shortfalls. In addition, the report recommends the establishment of a Logistics Subcommittee chaired by a lieutenant or captain, to give greater visibility and better integrate planning and operations for logistics.

Lessons Learned: Strengths

In examining the planning and execution phases of the WTO Conference event, SPD found numerous strengths as well as weaknesses. These should be sustained in planning for future events.

Officer and Allied Agency Performance

As asserted above, SPD's front line officers, supervisors, and commanders, enjoying critical support from the Washington State Patrol, the King County Sheriff's Office, and other allied agency partners, quite literally saved the day during the WTO Conference. The discipline and restraint shown by officers assigned to the line under very trying circumstances, working 15 to 18 hour shifts and often going without food and rest breaks, demonstrated the high quality, strength, and training of our regional law enforcement officers.

The role of these officers is often not well understood, particularly in highly emotional circumstances such as those presented by the WTO Conference. The oath sworn by police officers requires them to enforce the laws and maintain public order, to safeguard the basic democratic freedoms of speech and assembly. In the long hours of preparing for the Conference, SPD commanders kept continuously in view the delicate balance that would need to be struck to allow the WTO to meet and deliberate while facilitating the expression of strongly held opposing viewpoints. Throughout the the event itself, officers and commanders on the front line followed through to keep open the lines of communication to those who came to voice legitimate protest at the WTO. However, those who attempted to “shut down the WTO” were, in effect, attempting to deprive WTO delegates of their basic democratic freedoms.

Riot Control Methods and Use of Force

The methods used by SPD to restore order were fully consistent with the police rules regarding the use of force. The two basic guidelines regarding the “continuum of force” demonstrated at WTO are (1) that the force employed must be proportionate to the threat presented and (2) that the officer never relinquishes the right to self-defense.

When presented with the need to reopen the Downtown area and protect the rights of all people, SPD had two basic choices when those obstructing the area refused to obey a lawful police order to disperse: they could use batons, with the potential physical injury that they cause, or they could employ chemical irritants and other less lethal munitions. The use of chemical irritants and other less lethal munitions allowed SPD to open the area, allowing Conference delegates to move among venues while avoiding serious injuries or fatalities. SPD did well to choose the latter course of action.

Specialized Training

Training in crowd control, traffic escort, and chemical agent dissemination (CART Teams) was a strength that should be sustained in planning for future large-scale operations.

Conclusion

What do we need to do differently in the future? While the body of the report and lessons learned will show that there is no simple answer for this question, the major flaws resolve to a matter of planning. *Bottomline:* While the Department worked very hard to develop contingency plans for ensuring a safe and secure setting for the WTO, we did not develop a detailed, well-rehearsed plan for dealing with a “worst case” scenario. In retrospect, we relied too much on our collective memory of recent history (“fighting the last war”) and placed too little

credence on intelligence that ultimately proved to be accurate (the “new war”). In the future, SPD must be the bearer of bad news and, quite simply, assert serious misgivings about missions where there is not a realistic expectation of success. Accepting this charge, we will move forward a stronger and wiser police agency, more determined than ever to serve our citizens well.

Background

The World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO, which was established in 1995, “. . . is the only international agency overseeing the rules of international trade. Its purpose is to help trade flow smoothly, in a system based on rules, to settle trade disputes between governments, and to organize trade negotiations [see www.wto.org].”

The ongoing work of the WTO takes place in a series of small meetings held during the year at the headquarters of the organization, located in Geneva, Switzerland. Large ministerial meetings, scheduled biennially, allow the trade ministers to gather in a host city to conduct intensive negotiations and reach decisions that govern agreements which are binding on the organization’s 134 member nations.

Previous Ministerial Meetings

The first WTO Ministerial meeting was held in Singapore in December 1996. The government of Singapore employed its military to ensure that security for the event was tightly controlled. For example, government support included individually assigned vehicles with military drivers for each attending dignitary. There were no known protests in or around the meeting site.

In contrast to the meeting in Singapore, the Second WTO Ministerial, which was held in Geneva in May 1998, attracted international attention and protest. This meeting coincided with the 50th anniversary of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor organization. The second conference also was attended by 20 world leaders, including President Bill Clinton, and was located in a highly accessible European venue.

Security preparations for the Geneva meeting were extensive. Local police and military resources were utilized to secure venues, protect foreign dignitaries, move dignitaries and delegates around the city, and manage the expected protests. A “security zone” was established with concrete barriers, razor wire, metal and plastic fencing, and uniformed police staffing. Only properly credentialed persons could enter the secured perimeter around the meeting site.

This security zone was established before the conference started, thereby preventing demonstrations from accessing the conference venue.

As events unfolded, a large number of protestors appeared in Geneva. Daytime protest activities, including large marches that disrupted traffic, were relatively well organized. Near the site of the ministerial meetings, groups approached police lines and attempted to force entry to the police perimeter. However, protest activity occurred outside the secured perimeter and did not interrupt the Conference.

Some in the crowd broke windows, painted graffiti, and caused other disturbances. During nighttime activity, groups of lawbreakers damaged property, looted businesses, and clashed with police. In response, police used tear gas, water cannons, and made numerous arrests. During the second Conference, President Clinton's proposal for the WTO Ministerial to be held in the United States was accepted.

Seattle Bid Committee

After the Geneva meeting, business and trade proponents in the Seattle area, with support from local public officials, established a Seattle Bid Committee to bring the Third WTO Ministerial to the city. Seattle was one of 40 U.S. cities that expressed interest in hosting the meeting.

During the last quarter of 1998, SPD Assistant Chief Harv Ferguson met on two occasions with members of the Seattle Bid Committee and the City's Office of Intergovernmental Relations (OIR) to discuss bringing the WTO meeting here. Chief Ferguson provided a brief overview of SPD's experience handling major events, including the 1990 Goodwill Games and the 1993 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference. At that time, Bid Committee members expressed the view that the WTO Ministerial would be less of an event than either APEC or the Goodwill Games because no heads of state were expected.

Following the formal announcement by Mayor Schell on January 20, 1999, that Seattle had been awarded the bid to host the WTO, a WTO Public Safety Executive Committee was formed and initiated the planning process.

Seattle Host Organization (SHO)

Once Seattle was named as the site of the 1999 WTO Ministerial, a local host organization called the Seattle Host Organization (SHO) was established. The nucleus of the SHO was the Washington Council on International Trade (WCIT), the Boeing Company, and Microsoft. Together with representatives of City,

County and State Government, SHO formed a largely volunteer organization to plan the event. A subcommittee structure was used to create the conference plan, however, SHO specifically did not want to have a security subcommittee. Instead, some public safety representatives were invited to attend the general steering committee meetings of SHO that were held every other week. The SPD, FBI, and United States Department of State (USDS) regularly sent representatives to these steering committee meetings.

The WTO Secretariat in Geneva worked closely with both the Federal Government and SHO during their planning for the meetings in Seattle, but by the WTO's own request, did not participate in security planning. In several meetings with public safety officials, the WTO stated security was the executive responsibility of local law enforcement. This assertion was repeated in a meeting between the City and USDS in mid-February. Federal representatives emphatically stated that they would resist any attempts by the city to seek reimbursement from the State Department for WTO related expenses incurred by the city. The Seattle Police Department did not receive technical assistance or financial support from the WTO for the security of the Ministerial Conference.

Planning Process

Security planning for the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference began in mid-February, 1999 and involved agencies representing local, county, and federal jurisdictions. As such, the planning enterprise was a complex, interjurisdictional undertaking, with the Seattle Police Department playing the lead role. SPD planners committed over 11,600³ hours preparing for the Conference. Planners attended numerous meetings of SHO, the City Council Public Safety Committee, the Mayor's Office, as well as other planning subcommittee meetings.

Additionally, SPD Crime Prevention personnel and West Precinct command staff briefed the Downtown Seattle Association, the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA), the West Precinct Private Security Forum, the Human Service Provider Forum, and construction sites/developers to alert them to potential impacts by demonstrations. The context of these meetings was general preparedness for any disaster or emergency, to include the possibility of property damage due to unlawful demonstrations. Representatives of the City and SPD planners and Incident Commanders met extensively with the protest organizers in the months leading up to WTO. Meetings were also held with the National Lawyers Guild and the ACLU where public safety issues were discussed. Immediately prior to the event, police commanders met with representatives from announced protest groups. For the planned marches, police commanders met with the Sierra Club, Washington Association Council of Churches, and AFL-CIO to ensure safe and successful processions.

WTO Mission Statement

The formal mission statement given to WTO planners is stated succinctly in the Public Safety Committee Operations Plan: “. . . to provide prompt efficient and appropriate public safety service to Conference attendees and citizens of the Puget Sound region.” The principal tasks associated with the mission statement were:

- Provision of security for Conference facilities (called venues);
- Provision of VIP escort services and dignitary protection;
- Provision of traffic management services
- Provision of demonstration management services for protest activity.

Early in the planning process, the scope of the event was uncertain. Planning focused on traffic management and dignitary protection as dignitaries would need to move among venues. Planning later focused on demonstration management when it became clear that the Conference would likely attract protest activity.

³ Training hours as recorded by SPD Timekeeping Unit

Planners were faced with difficult tasks of balancing the requirement to provide a safe and secure conference environment, the creation of a virtual foreign embassy for 134 countries in downtown Seattle, and with the equally important goal of establishing a public safety plan conducive to full, free, and legal expression by critics of the WTO and its policies. In addition, the planners were confronted with the requirement to ensure that the movement of citizens involved in downtown commerce, seasonal shopping, or other ordinary activities would be minimally impacted.

Public Safety Planning Participants

Planning for public safety at the WTO Ministerial Conference was a three-tiered process: Public Safety Executive Committee, Public Safety Committee, and Public Safety Subcommittees. These committees and the SPD WTO Planning Unit were presented with the task of coordinating multiple agencies to provide a safe and secure environment for the conference.

Public Safety Executive Committee

On February 12, 1999, the Public Safety Executive Committee was established. The Committee was comprised of command representatives from the following agencies:

- Seattle Police Department - Chief Norm Stamper
(*Delegated to Assistant Chief Edward Joiner*)
- King County Sheriff's Office - Sheriff David Reichert
(*Delegated to Assistant Chief Jackson Beard*)
- Seattle Fire Department - Chief James Sewell
- Washington State Patrol - Chief Annette Sandberg
- FBI - SAC Burdena Pasenelli
- U.S. Secret Service - SAC Ronald Legan

Public Safety Committee

On March 11, 1999, the Public Safety Executive Committee announced it had formed a working group, the Public Safety Committee (PSC). The PSC was an interjurisdictional organization established to coordinate the public safety planning for the Conference. Representatives from local, state, and federal public safety agencies comprised the Committee, with the Seattle Police Department designated as the lead agency. SPD Assistant Chief Ed Joiner was designated as chair of the group. The Public Safety Committee met twice per month until mid-September, when the group began meeting weekly. The interjurisdictional agencies involved in the PSC were as follows:

- Seattle Police Department (SPD)
- Seattle Fire Department (SFD)
- Bellevue Police Department (BPD)
- Tukwila Police Department (TPD)
- King County Sheriff's Office (KCSO)
- Port of Seattle Police Department (POSPD)
- Washington State Patrol (WSP)
- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
- Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
- Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
- U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (USDS)
- U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

Other agencies attended the PSC or subcommittee meetings when needed to coordinate particular aspects of the planning process. These agencies included:

- Gray Line Transportation
- Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
- Kent Police Department (KPD)
- King County Department of Adult Detention (KCAD)
- King County Prosecutor's Office
- King County METRO Transit
- Seattle Host Organization (SHO)
- Seattle Law Department
- Seattle Municipal Court
- Seattle Transportation Department (SeaTran)
- Seattle Executive Services Department
- Washington National Guard
- Washington State Department of Transportation (WDOT)
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Customs
- Valley SWAT Agencies

The SPD Planning Unit

As the lead agency, SPD established a full-time planning unit for liaison with the PSC and to coordinate the work of the subcommittees. The planning unit was staffed with a captain, a lieutenant, a sergeant, two officers, and at various times throughout the planning phase, by three other limited duty officers.

The SPD Planning Unit was charged with:

- Plan Preparation. Coordinate the overall operations and staffing plan, incorporating the work of all subcommittees, to accomplish the mission.

- **Provide Command and Control:** Establish a Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) for overall coordination and control of agencies deployed during the Conference. Because the WTO Operations Plan gave SPD overall tactical command for Seattle venues, SPD was responsible for activating the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC), using the Incident Command System (ICS), and working closely with the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during the event.

- **Conduct Liaison:** Coordinate with City, other public and private agencies as necessary to accomplish the mission.

Public Safety Subcommittees

The PSC established numerous subcommittees to develop detailed security plans for the WTO Conference. The role of the subcommittees was to address the tasks inherent in the mission statement. Each of these planning subcommittees and related tasks were designed to correlate with duties to be performed during the week of the Conference. The individual subcommittees were as follows:

- Intelligence
- Venues
- Demonstration Management
- Accreditation
- Transportation and Escort Management
- Criminal Investigations
- Communication
- Public Information/Media
- Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Hazardous Materials, Weapons of Mass Destruction (EOD/HazMat/WMD)
- Fire and Emergency Medical (Fire/EMT)
- Tactical

Although not specifically identified in the PSC subcommittee structure, the following additional planning tasks were required:

- **Logistics:** Identify, acquire, distribute and account for material items needed to support the public safety operation. Examples include vehicles, food, radio batteries, office supplies, and munitions. Each agency was responsible for this task unless otherwise specified.

- **Personnel/Finance:** Identify personnel for specific event assignments. Track labor and equipment costs associated with the event. Allied agencies were responsible for tracking their own costs associated with the conference.

- **Training:** Train personnel to be deployed for the WTO Conference. Each subcommittee was responsible for identifying training needs for the safe and effective deployment of security personnel (e.g., the demonstration management subcommittee addressed the need for training in crowd control and use of force).

Each subcommittee named a “lead” of the rank of lieutenant or above, responsible for coordinating subcommittee work as well as reporting to the SPD Planning Unit in bi-weekly meetings. All planners, except those assigned to the Planning Unit, were expected to engage in planning activities in addition to their regular duty assignments.

On September 28, 1999, the planning subcommittees compiled and submitted a draft Operations Plan to the Public Safety Executive Committee for review and comment. After soliciting comments from the PSC participants, the revised plan was approved and distributed as a *“restricted document – for public safety and law enforcement only”* – in the second week of November. This plan, a copy of which accompanies this report, was the culmination of the efforts of all planning groups and was designed to be an organizational document outlining roles, responsibilities, and general procedures for the public safety agencies working to support the Conference. This document was distributed to all of the participating public safety agencies and was also shared with the Mayor’s Office and representatives of the Seattle City Council. Due to the sensitive information it contained, it was not intended for the public prior to the event.

The Operations Guide was created to detail individual operational responsibilities during the event. Each subcommittee, working with regional assets in the planning phase of the Conference, generated subsections of the overall Operations Guide, detailing their operational responsibilities during the Conference. As the contents of the Guide were law enforcement sensitive, it was distributed only to the individual commanders of each participating agency.

Intelligence Planning

Overview

Acquiring reliable intelligence information is a fundamental component of effective planning. It is also one of the most problematic and complex endeavors undertaken by law enforcement. Under the best of circumstances, intelligence data seldom possesses the precision and detail sufficient to predict the movements of individuals, let alone disparate groups. Reliable and accurate information is almost always buried amidst rumors and alarmist rhetoric that is invalid, as well as disinformation deliberately designed to impact an event through the diversion of focus and resources. And unique to Seattle, the constraints imposed by SMC 14.12 "City of Seattle Investigations Ordinance" delayed the gathering and sharing of intelligence information.

For all the inherent limitations of intelligence gathering, the bottom line is this: The Seattle Police Department did not plan to a level of sufficient depth in response to possible "worst case" scenarios brought forth by intelligence analysts in the weeks leading up to the WTO ministerial.

Background and Summary

The 10-member Seattle Police Department Criminal Intelligence Section (1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 7 Detectives) is part of an anti-terrorism task force consisting of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. In late spring of 1999, this task force coalesced into the WTO Information Management (A.K.A. The Intelligence) Subcommittee. This Committee met twice monthly until October, at which time members held weekly meetings until the start of the WTO ministerial. In addition to SPD, the major contributing members of this subcommittee were the FBI, King County Sheriff's Office, and the Washington State Patrol. The US Secret Service was involved with issues of dignitary protection.

The subcommittee provided a network for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence and criminal information related to the public safety operation for the WTO conference. Valid intelligence information was provided to WTO planners and commanders on a continuous basis as information was obtained.

For the first 5 months of the planning process (February – June), there was little indication of the potential for criminal agitation during the WTO. The prevailing mood concerning the Seattle round of WTO was one of cautious optimism. The experience in Geneva of the previous year was the only significant signal of

possible problems, but that incident was viewed as unique to Europe and highly unlikely to migrate to the U.S. Moreover, the use of physical barricades and razor wire to secure the ministerial conference in Geneva was viewed as inflammatory, leading to the assumption that Seattle's more open and facilitative approach to demonstrations would lessen the chances of violence and property destruction.

In mid - June and early July, there were the first substantive, though sketchy, indications that WTO was a potential target of criminal activity. On July 7th, the FBI issued its first of two threat assessments. This assessment stated there was a "strong indication" considerable protest activity will be directed at the Seattle round of the WTO, but concluded that there was "no credible information" to suggest that "violence or significant property damage" should be expected to accompany these demonstrations. Even though the FBI did not consider the threat of riot or criminal agitation credible, the SPD nonetheless responded to this skeletal information by doubling its planned deployment of demonstration management platoons (from 90 to 180 officers), and initiated requests for training and additional riot control equipment. These requests were supported by the Executive and expenditures were charged against an account established to track WTO related equipment and personnel expenses.

In August and September, the frequency and virulence of rumors and reports of planned and spontaneous disruptive acts increased, principally via the Internet and other media. Most of these reports were alarming, and many were preposterous. Events like the WTO invariably attract doomsayers and extremist rhetoric. The challenge of intelligence gathering is to separate disinformation and fallacious reports from potentially authentic data. In hindsight, it is clear that fragments of information gathered during this period were accurate and predictive.

These intelligence assessments, however, did not definitively suggest that SPD was incapable of handling potential demonstrations. As late as mid-November for example, the second and last FBI threat assessment stated that the "threat of violent protest activity directed at the WTO ministerial is low to medium."⁴

In November, the work of the Intelligence Subcommittee culminated in the dissemination of a report through a series of comprehensive oral and written briefings. These briefings occurred during the three weeks immediately preceding the WTO opening ceremonies. At this time, the WTO Information Management Subcommittee reported to WTO planners and commanders that there was a strong likelihood that groups of organized extremists were planning to use a variety of specific tactics to "shut down the WTO". In these briefings, a number of potential tactics were identified and communicated to demonstration

⁴ This FBI threat assessment is dated November 17, 1999 and was included in the written briefing materials provided three weeks prior to the Conference.

management commanders, and specifically MACC and SPOC personnel on 11/23, and EOC personnel on 11/28.

As part of these briefings, specific potential tactics were identified, including the use of blockades, property destruction, the hanging of banners, “arrest-a-thons” and non-cooperation aimed at overwhelming the criminal justice system, “street theater”, and simultaneous disruption and/or property damage aimed at multiple targets. This information was thorough, detailed, and much of it proved to be accurate.

Adding to the assessment of the potential for criminal disruptive tactics during the WTO was the takeover of the Plum Creek Timber offices on October 28, and the arson at the downtown GAP store on November 1.

The Seattle Police Department did not disregard these intelligence reports. SPD planning in response to the escalating threat reports conformed to three basic principals:

1. Plan for 100% mobilization of SPD internal resources.
2. Rely upon mutual aid resources through call-out.
3. Trust that Seattle’s strong historical precedents of peaceful protest and our on-going negotiations with protest groups would govern the actions of demonstrators.

The decision not to ask for commitments of pre-deployed resources from allied agencies was based upon the reluctance of SPD Incident Commanders to ask our law enforcement partners to commit resources without promise of reimbursement. The compromise position, instead, was to request designated mutual aid resources available via call-out as the situation required.

One specific resource shift in response to the intelligence assessment was the creation of a “flying squad” to intercept the illegal tactics of extremists. The ultimate goal of the 16 member uniformed squad, with the support of 14 plain clothed detectives, was to arrest and remove extremists engaged in criminal acts and in so doing, undermine and disrupt their criminal organization. Unfortunately, this cadre was re-deployed when the Tuesday disturbances overwhelmed law enforcement and jeopardized the security of delegates. Because of continuous critical staffing shortfalls, the “flying squad” was never reestablished.

Intelligence analysts found it difficult to quantify the size and number of protesters intent upon “shutting down the WTO” through violent and illegal tactics. The impact of the tens of thousands of other demonstrators, and the ability of criminal extremists to disrupt the WTO in the shadow of and physically shielded by otherwise peaceful marchers and demonstrators could not be accurately assessed. In addition, the intelligence committee was unable to

identify with precision the extent to which protesters participating in other marches or events were co-opted to assist in the criminal acts of the extremists, or obstruct their apprehension by law enforcement.

One of the most dramatic examples of the impact of partial intelligence information occurred prior to WTO opening ceremonies on November 30. It became increasingly evident that criminal agitators were targeting the Paramount and Convention Center as part of a strategy to prevent staging the opening ceremonies. In response, SPD hardened the perimeter around these two sites, created corridors through the placement of metro busses, and other prudent operational measures. What was unforeseen, and unpredicted by intelligence, was the specific tactic of targeting delegates at the hotel venues as they attempted to make their way to the opening ceremonies. This resulted in the need for a rapid shift in operational focus, which in turn resulted in redeployments such as that involving the “flying squad”.

In short, while the intelligence assessment ultimately was proved to be accurate, it was nevertheless problematic. As stated above, the definitive intelligence report was disseminated three weeks prior to the WTO opening ceremonies. Long before that time, SPD had exhausted its staffing capacity and had no further resources to deploy. Consequently, the response to the intelligence report was limited to a reassessment of deployment plans, and reassignment of resources to bolster the demonstrations management component.

The Impact of the City of Seattle Investigations Ordinance

Any discussion of the intelligence gathering process would be incomplete without an analysis of the Seattle Investigations Ordinance:

The Investigations Ordinance, SMC 14.12, prohibits the collection of political or religious information for law enforcement purposes unless there is a threat of criminal activity with an immediate nexus to the City of Seattle. Authorization to collect information may be obtained on a showing of reasonable suspicion that the subject of the restricted information has engaged in, is engaging in, or about to engage in unlawful activity in Seattle.

Any information collected under the authorization is required to be reviewed by a civilian auditor. Penalty for violating the ordinance includes substantial monetary fines and mandates. Also, the information collection may be shared with the investigated entity. Consequently, if the department does not have an authorization to collect the information, an investigation may not ensue. If an authorization is obtained, allied agencies are reluctant to forward intelligence information pertinent to their investigation for fear of release of information and consequent compromise of officer safety, informant safety, and/or the investigation itself.

On balance, the Investigations Ordinance created significant problems for SPD during the planning phases for WTO. The SPD Criminal Intelligence Section contributed little hard intelligence because of our inability to investigate any of the individuals or groups that ultimately did the most damage. This was due to the fact that these groups were politically motivated and consequently enjoyed the full protection of the ordinance. In addition, our allied law enforcement agencies who developed intelligence information were reluctant to share information that potentially violated the ordinance, and that would have to be ultimately reviewed by the auditor. There was concern the ordinance would penalize agencies in that a finding of improper collection of information on our part could result in that information being made available to the same groups under investigation. At one point in the period of time immediately prior to opening ceremonies, the agencies participating in the Information Management Subcommittee were forced to consider whether Seattle Police should be factored out of the loop for sensitive information. For three days in fact, SPD was not included in the intelligence information process as this point was being analyzed. It is important to note that the existence of the ordinance was not totally crippling, and that SPD ultimately obtained authorizations pursuant to the requirements of the ordinance on September 28th. It is also accurate to say that this ordinance significantly impacted and delayed SPD's ability to collect and analyze intelligence data.

Intelligence Team Deployments During WTO

During the WTO conference period, Situational Assessment Teams (SAT's) were deployed and charged with providing operations commanders, SPOC and MACC personnel and field units with on-view, real time intelligence concerning demonstration activity. SAT units were involved in observation of most significant street demonstrations, including those occurring on Capitol Hill. SAT Units also observed acts of property damage, and working in conjunction with undercover Vice/Narcotics personnel, arrested a total of 36 suspects (12 felony and 24 misdemeanor) for WTO related crimes.

Operations Planning

Venue Security

The Ministerial organizers – SHO, WTO (Geneva), and the Federal Government – sponsored numerous events during the WTO Conference. Due to the anticipated attendance of the President, and an unknown number of dignitaries requiring personal protection⁵, significant security planning was required for the venues. The most visible events included the following:

- Convention Center – Monday through Friday (24-hour operation)
- Opening Reception – Stadium Exhibition Center (Monday Evening – November 29th)
- Opening Plenary - Paramount Theater (Tuesday Morning – November 30th)
- Ministerial Dinner – Museum of Flight (Tuesday Evening – November 30th)
- Westin Hotel – Lodging for President Clinton (Wednesday Evening through Thursday Morning)
- U.S. Trade Representative Lunch – Olympic Four Seasons (Wednesday – December 1st)
- WTO Director General Reception - Sheraton (Wednesday Evening – December 1st)
- Opera House (Thursday Evening – December 2nd)

Although the last two events were cancelled during the course of the Conference, a planning effort was still required. While the venue selection was largely the responsibility of the SHO, during planning the PSC made it clear that securing the original venues used for the opening reception and closing events was problematic from a security standpoint. These concerns were taken into consideration, and different venues and programs were selected.

In addition to the most visible venues, approximately 8,000 people were expected to participate in the WTO Ministerial, to report on it, or to provide support services. They were to be housed in over 38 hotels throughout the metropolitan area. Five of the largest hotels⁶ were designated as SPD venues in order to provide an enhanced public safety presence. The security deployments to these venues, either as a 24-hour site or a moment-in-time site, required substantial public safety resources.

In preparation for the event, and in response to comments received from several groups planning to demonstrate at the Conference, protest areas were created

⁵ For security purposes, dignitary protection services often cannot give local law enforcement advance notice of an arriving dignitary.

⁶ Westin, Cavanaugh's, Sheraton, Four Seasons, Renaissance Madison.

adjacent to each venue. In concert with the Secret Service, a barrier plan was developed and implemented to help restrict access to certain protected sites. The purpose of this barrier plan was ultimately to protect the President who visited the conference on December 1st through the 2nd.

Detailed preparations were also made to support public safety personnel assigned to fixed venues with break areas, hot food, sack lunches, beverages, and other essential supplies. Additional preparations were made to accommodate mobile units (e.g. SWAT, EOD and Demonstration Management).

Demonstration Management

The Demonstration Management subcommittee developed a plan to provide crowd control and related services to address criminally disruptive activity. The philosophy underlying planning for demonstration management provided safeguards for individual freedoms as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution to include the opportunity to demonstrate peacefully within the law. When peaceful demonstrations become unlawful, and infringe upon the rights and safety of others, law enforcement must be prepared to respond with fair and impartial enforcement. Co-equal with the responsibility to provide for lawful demonstrations is the requirement to safeguard the freedom enjoyed by every citizen to meet, move without impediment, and go about one's private business. The police are charged with maintaining all of these sometimes conflicting freedoms to the maximum extent possible. However, once a threat to public safety or violation of law is determined, officers must take steps - including the use of necessary force - to restore order and protect the community.

Based on training provided by the Demonstration Management Training Team, SPD officers use force based on the "use of force continuum." (See Appendix A) The "use of force continuum" is the standard governing crowd control used by virtually all law enforcement agencies in America and Europe.

Initial planning efforts involved meetings with identified demonstration organizers designed to facilitate lawful demonstrations and to acknowledge the interests of all parties involved. Designated protest areas were identified and communicated to protest organizers. The locations were selected with the goal of giving protesters access to their intended audience as well as to allow freedom of movement for delegates and citizens not involved in the Conference.

Initially, planners envisioned the Seattle Police SWAT as the primary crowd management group with assistance from precinct anti-crime teams. As the SWAT mission was expanded to include tactical and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response, the demonstration management function was transferred to other personnel. Throughout the planning process, the Incident Commander emphasized the importance of placing Seattle Police personnel in

the front line of contact with demonstrators. The reason for this decision was to prevent exposure of allied agencies' personnel to injury, complaints and lawsuits.

Based upon emerging though still unsubstantiated intelligence, a command decision was made to staff the Seattle Police Demonstration Management contingent with four demonstration management platoons instead of two, in addition to the Arrest/Booking Team, and the Prisoner Transport Team. (See Appendix B). Each demonstration management platoon consisted of 45 personnel. Two platoons were equipped with "hardened" gear to include protective torso, arm, hand and leg guards, chemical agent protective masks, and long batons. The two remaining platoons were deployed in Class 'A' uniforms equipped with helmets, long batons, and chemical agent protective masks. As the threat assessment increased, a fifth platoon comprised of 1st and 3rd Watch personnel was created in mid-November. This fifth platoon was also equipped with helmets, long batons, and some personnel were fitted with chemical agent protective masks. This platoon was to be used as an emergency task force.

The demonstration management platoons were to be supported by four Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART) which were to deploy chemical irritants and less lethal munitions for crowd control. Current and former SPD SWAT members staffed the CART Teams.

Like the Demonstration Management Platoons, CART Team staffing was not planned for the night deployments, as the risk of demonstrations continuing late into the night was assessed as a low probability.

The Washington State Patrol, with 55 troopers organized into two platoons, and the King County Sheriff's Office, with 90 deputies, were available for emergency mutual aid demonstration management duties during the Conference. The team from the King County Sheriff's Office was to be deployed at the Museum of Flight and the King County Airport. The Washington State Patrol team worked a twelve hour shift and was assigned primarily to control traffic flow on and around the freeway and in emergencies as needed at other venue sites. Both agencies were pre-staged and available to assist Seattle through mutual aid should the need arise. (See Appendixes C and D for details on law enforcement staffing).

Two weeks prior to the Conference, a special team or "flying squad" was formed to identify and arrest individuals attempting to engage in property destruction, looting, and other criminal behavior. The team was comprised of a 14 person team of plain-clothes detectives and 16 uniformed personnel and would receive information necessary for deployment from direct observation as well as intelligence reports from the field.

The Accreditation Process and Access Control

During the WTO Ministerial, the WTO (Geneva) controlled who would have access to the venues by deciding who was an authorized delegate or member of the press. Similarly, the U.S. Secret Service controlled who could be close to their protected dignitaries, such as the President.

Typically, credentials with a current photo are issued to authorized persons and “gatekeepers” grant or deny access based on the type of badge presented by a person requesting entry. Additional screening may be used to ensure that no weapons are brought into a venue. The U.S. Department of State hired a private contractor to make badges for persons approved by WTO (Geneva). The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) provided the system for issuing credentials to authorized public safety personnel and a number of support staff. SPD assisted the USSS, but did not have authority to independently issue or produce credentials.

The accreditation mission was undefined and constantly changing. The only written information regarding the evolving accreditation plan came from the Subcommittee itself, based on sketchy, verbal information. The Credentialing Center began issuing credentials on November 15th while negotiations among the USSS, SHO, and WTO on how the plan would operate continued into the event itself

The Accreditation Subcommittee’s only knowledgeable source of information on how to plan or prepare was the USSS Major Events Unit in Washington D.C. Neither SHO nor WTO had liaisons with the Subcommittee. Numerous unsuccessful efforts were made to find information on how the SHO/WTO accreditation plan would operate so this information could be shared with other agencies and assist in integration of the Subcommittee’s plan.

Early in November, it became apparent for the first time that WTO controlled access to the Convention Center while the SHO controlled access to the other sites and that they had different agendas. At that time SHO hired a consultant to work with the USSS and the WTO to negotiate an overall credentialing plan. These negotiations continued into the event.

Decisions as to which sites were to be secured and where personnel were to be assigned continued to change after the Credentialing Center began operations. This caused many unneeded credentials to be issued and required many more to be issued on an emergency basis.

Sixty different SPD clerical staff rotated through the 6 clerical positions at the Credentialing Center in 4-hour shifts. SPD did not have sufficient personnel available to dedicate to this task so it was done primarily on an overtime basis in addition to the staff's regular jobs. This necessitated continual training of new people and resulted in a lack of consistency and experience that would have occurred with a dedicated staff.

During the Conference, those entering the Convention Center and several other locations were to pass through magnetometers at weapons screening checkpoints. The cost to establish these weapons checkpoints and the badging system was significant in terms of production and administrative costs. Magnetometers require a crew of trained operators in addition to gatekeepers posted at the entrance to deny access to unauthorized persons.

Due to an absence of funding from WTO and the Federal Government, SHO was required to set up a third badging system 45 days prior to the start of the event. Originally, SHO had intended to fund the magnetometer operation but experienced difficulties in financing this cost. The USSS and the State Department provided equipment and operators for the magnetometer 30 days prior to the start of the conference. SPD provided a support staff of reserve officers and recent SPD Academy graduates to support the operation.

Transportation and Escort Management

SHO worked with WTO (Geneva), the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, U.S. Department of State, and the White House to organize, prioritize, and ultimately to fund the transportation system put in place to move the approximately 8,000 participants in the Conference. Gray Line Transportation was contracted to create a bus service linking the hotels, the airport, and the event sites. These contracted busses were the main form of transportation during the event, though drivers and vehicles were made available to ministers. Delegations also rented vehicles on their own while protected dignitaries had their transportation provided by the Federal Government.

The Escort and Traffic Subcommittee worked with organizers to ensure that arrivals, departures, and routes were established in accordance with the overall security plan. Last minute funding shortfalls within SHO threatened to compromise the transportation plan. However, SHO was ultimately able to secure funding from the Federal Government to allow the transportation plan to be implemented.

Criminal Investigations

Distributed guidelines to involved law enforcement agencies regarding interaction between foreign nationals and the American criminal justice system. Participants

included: Seattle Police, Port of Seattle Police, Tukwila Police, King County Sheriff, FBI, USDS, USSS, and the U.S. Attorney.

C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Coordinated multi-agency radio communications. Participants included: Seattle Police, Seattle Fire, City Radio Shop, Port of Seattle Police, Tukwila Police, King County Sheriff, County Communications, Washington State Patrol, and FBI.

P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n / M e d i a

The Public Information Officer(PIO)-Media subcommittee, comprised of PIOs from the Seattle Police Department, Seattle Fire Department, Washington State Patrol, King County Sheriff's Office, and the FBI, began meeting in April 1999.

The group was structured under the ICS model as a support function for the Incident Commander. Based on the structure, the "lead agency" incident commander worked with the lead agency PIO and the non-lead agency PIOs acted in support of the lead PIO.

To facilitate ICS objectives, the PIO staff was located adjacent to the command center, allowing quick access to information needed for effective communication with the public. The subcommittee agreed to work as a team to ensure prompt, efficient dissemination of information regardless of lead agency status.

The command decision was ultimately made to divide public information responsibilities during the conference between the Field Reporting Center (FRC), staffed by the PIO-Media Subcommittee, and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), staffed by other City PIOs. Ultimately, this system proved to be confusing, duplicative, and did not provide an effective flow of public information.

E x p l o s i v e O r d i n a n c e D i s p o s a l / H a z a r d o u s M a t e r i a l s

W e a p o n s o f M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n (E O D / H a z M a t / W M D)

The EOD component of this subcommittee provided a coordinated assessment and response to bombs or bomb threats. The Hazardous Materials and WMD components of this subcommittee provided a coordinated assessment and response to the possibility of chemical, biological, or nuclear contamination, whether accidentally or intentionally released. Participants included: Seattle Police, Seattle Fire, Port of Seattle, King County Sheriff, Washington State Patrol, U.S. Postal Service, ATF, and FBI.

Fire/E M S

This subcommittee managed and coordinated fire response, medical emergencies (EMS), hazardous materials incidents, and other disasters. Participants included: Seattle Fire and Tukwila Fire.

Logistics Planning

Less Lethal Munitions and Chemical Irritants

In preparing for the WTO Conference, the Seattle Police Department planned for a basic inventory and procedure for re-supply of chemical irritants and other less lethal munitions. The initial inventory was set at a level based on eight hours of on-going use by the Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART). SPD preordered quantities of chemical irritants and less lethal munitions. As part of the re-supply plan, arrangements were made for rapid air delivery of additional munitions from the Defensive Technology factory in Wyoming. Additionally, a list of available munitions from allied agencies was developed.

A chemical irritant and less lethal response plan was developed by the Special Patrol Unit. Four CART Teams, each comprised of a sergeant and three to five officers, were formed for the Conference. Officers were selected for their experience and training in the use of chemical irritants and less lethal impact munitions. CART was assigned to work under the Field Incident Commander and was intended to provide a swift and highly mobile response. CART Teams were deployed for daytime operations when WTO meetings were scheduled and when it was anticipated that the largest crowds would be present.

A pre-event inventory of chemical irritants and less lethal munitions was established. It was difficult to estimate the amount of chemical irritants that would be needed, as there had been no precedent for their usage in the last 20 years. CART was provided with a supply of munitions based on a planning estimate to last through approximately two days of moderate usage or one day of heavy use.⁷ This corresponded with the low to moderate risk assessment for the Conference, and proved to be an accurate supply for the amount of time for which it was estimated for. The amount of chemical irritants was sufficient to meet the operational need beyond the first day, however, as the need for crowd dispersal continued throughout the next few days, SPD was forced to rely on the chemical irritant resupply plan. In addition to this plan, the SWAT commander created a list of available mutual aid munitions and contact phone numbers in the event of a resupply. (Appendix E provides information on the chemical irritants and less lethal munitions used at WTO. Appendix F details the resupply plan.)

⁷ Eight launchers were purchased for \$ 7,600 and an additional supply of chemical irritants and less lethal munitions was obtained for \$ 8,100.

Respiratory Protection

The Respiratory Protection Program Administrator asked for a prioritized list of personnel who may be exposed to chemical irritants dependant on their assignment for the Conference. The list was needed as there was a limited number of masks and time remaining for training and fit testing for the mask. It was understood that first watch personnel would be responsible for handling 911 calls in the precincts. First watch West Precinct officers were the most likely to be required to answer calls within the downtown core, and were fitted with new masks. As a result of equipment and training time constraints, first watch officers in the remaining precincts were not issued new masks and had to rely on the M-17 military masks issued in previous years or had no mask.

Overall Staffing Plan

Initial Planning

Several efforts were made to complete the staffing plan process. Early in the planning process, the Special Deployment Unit was tasked with completing an initial projection of Seattle Police personnel available to staff the event. On May 13, 1999, 41 city and county executives were sent a letter by Mayor Schell asking them to identify law enforcement resources that would be available for staffing the Conference. Most of those who responded were not able to participate, citing insufficient staffing levels. Additionally, lack of committed funding and guarantee of reimbursement contributed to the problem of gaining allied agency support.

The following PSC member agencies committed the following resources to staff the Conference.

Washington State Patrol

- 27 motorcycles and 40 patrol cars for escort duty
- 55 troopers for demonstration management duty
(to respond based on a request for emergency mutual aid)
- 13 SWAT officers
- 4 bomb squad technicians and 2 explosives detection K-9 teams
- Communications personnel

King County Sheriff's Office

- 13 motorcycles
- 90 officers for demonstration management
(to respond based on a request for emergency mutual aid)
- 35 officers for Key Arena Venue
- 8 SWAT officers

- 1 bomb squad team
- Media relations personnel

Port of Seattle Police

- Managed the Bell Harbor venue with venue security personnel, bomb squad team, and an explosives detection K-9 team

Bellevue Police

- 8 motorcycles

Additional agencies contributing resources for the conference security plan at this point included:

Kent Police

- 5 motorcycles

Auburn, Renton, Tukwila (Valley SWAT)

- 10 officers

The **Tukwila Police Department** and **King County Sheriff's Office** created a security plan for the Museum of Flight venue with limited Seattle Police support. KCSO also developed a security plan for Boeing Field. (See Appendixes C and D for details on law enforcement staffing).

Contingency Planning

During the summer, the Planning Unit, anticipating a need for additional resources, inquired into pre-staging the Washington National Guard (WNG) in Seattle during the Conference. It became clear that the WNG could not commit in advance to call up or deploy forces to assist SPD without first meeting the statutory predicate that requires the full utilization/exhaustion of local resources before they are deployed. Emergency deployment of the WNG was discussed during WTO planning. Without the solid commitment of having WNG staged or pre-staged, their assistance for demonstration management or security was not part of the planning for WTO, other than in the case of an extreme emergency. Late offers to assist law enforcement made during the weekend before WTO were limited to tour vehicle escort, or to check I.D. on tour vehicles by 50 plainclothes Washington National Guard Troops. This was determined to be unnecessary, and would not enhance security for WTO visitors.⁸

⁸ The Washington National Guard (WNG) was deployed on Wednesday 12/1/1999 at the direction of the Governor.

Final Planning Process

On November 17th, as part of the final planning process to determine available emergency mutual aid resources, law enforcement agencies within King County, including those already committed to the event, were asked to identify police resources that would be available if emergency mutual aid was invoked. A list of available resources was created and maintained in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) for use should the need for emergency mutual aid arise.

SPD developed an agreement with the King County Sheriff's Office to back-fill SPD patrol staffing in the event those officers were needed in the downtown core or at Conference venues. Other suburban agencies would then provide patrol coverage for the redeployed King County Sheriff's deputies.

The Special Deployment Unit had difficulty projecting the exact number of available resources per day. The *initial* staffing estimate of available personnel was greater than the *actual* number of available personnel due to inaccurate data. Additionally, special event vacation approval procedures were not in place for the Conference until April 22. Any vacations approved before that date were retained in the unit of origin and were not forwarded to the staffing unit until October.

In determining the full security requirements for the Conference, the planners were forced to respond to the changing venue selections and event schedules imposed by the Seattle Host Organization. There was a possibility that a head of state from China and Cuba might attend the Conference which would have increased security staffing requirements even further.⁹

Additional requirements for staffing were caused by an expanding need for demonstration management. This resulted from an increased awareness of the potential for criminal tactics and the recommendations of the training consultant. Further, expanding support functions impacted available staffing.

The difficulties presented with an initial inflated representation of available staffing availability coupled with changing mission requirements, resulted in a command decision to reallocate personnel. Reductions in planned staffing were made across the board to include venue staffing, prisoner processing, and demonstration management. This realignment resulted in the elimination of relief duty assignments and an overall reduction of staffing below the projected staffing levels previously specified.

⁹ It was not determined until November 28, 1999, that Fidel Castro would not be attending the conference.

Training

Each subcommittee was required to complete training assessments and plans to address individual training needs. The Demonstration Management Subcommittee identified and completed a comprehensive training agenda prior to the Conference. A summary of the training follows:

- SPD trained over 900 sworn personnel through the rank of Captain in crowd management techniques. This training consisted of a 9 hour initial crowd management class, weekly squad level practice sessions, and three 4 hour Demonstration Management platoon-level practical exercises and a 4 hour session with all of the platoons practicing formations together.
- Included in demonstration management training were approximately 60 personnel from Tukwila Police and 30 personnel from the University of Washington Police Department. This totaled approximately 9,540 personnel hours of training in demonstration management techniques. The King County Sheriff's Office and Washington State Patrol followed a similar training scheme.
- One month prior to the 9 hours of crowd control training, a refresher course of basic commands, formations and tactics was presented by the training team to patrol officers and supervisors. Following the crowd control training, patrol supervisors conducted twice weekly practice sessions on commands, formations, and tactics.
- Nearly 900 new chemical agent protective masks were purchased and issued to SPD personnel. Each employee issued a chemical agent protective mask received a 1 ½ hour OSHA mandated training session to "fit test" the mask. This added an additional 1350 personnel hours of training for personal protective equipment.
- On three different occasions, demonstration management experts were brought in to provide training for SPD officers and commanders. An 8 hour Crisis Incident Decision Making course was attended by supervisors and commanders. A consultant recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conducted two training sessions in Seattle attended by officers, supervisors and commanders; one for 24 hours and a second for 16 hours. The first 24 hour session was attended by commanders up to the rank of Captain.
- Thirty SWAT officers went to Ft. McClellan, Alabama for a 32 hour course on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training. Two SWAT supervisors and two SWAT commanders attended an additional 24 hours of WMD training and 24 hours of ICS Command training.

- The Secret Service offered two days of dignitary protection and escort training to all motorcycle officers from Seattle Police, King County Sheriff, Washington State Patrol, Bellevue Police, and Kent Police; totaling over 3,200 personnel hours of training time. Additionally, 120 escort personnel received 16 hours of basic and advanced escort training totaling 1,920 personnel hours. Orientation to city geography constituted an additional 960 personnel hours. The total training for dignitary and escort was 6,080 personnel hours.
- Updated information on diplomatic immunity and handling of foreign nationals was distributed to SPD personnel.
- Members of the PSC participated in two intensive tabletop exercises sponsored by the Secret Service and the FBI.

Summary of Events

Friday, November 26, 1999

The Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) was activated on Friday, November 26th at 0700 hours and remained operational until 1200 hours on December 4, 1999. The Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) did not become fully operational until Monday, November 29 although personnel from various agencies represented in the MACC began arriving and staffing their positions throughout the Thanksgiving weekend that immediately preceded the Conference.

Although the WTO Conference was not scheduled to start until Monday, an early activation of the SPOC was necessary. This allowed the staff sufficient time to ensure proper set up and operation of communication and control systems and to review operating procedures prior to the actual start of the Conference. Planners also believed that anti-WTO forces might begin protesting on Friday, an assessment that proved correct.

Protest activity throughout the day was relatively light. Early in the day, two groups of 30-50 demonstrators protested and marched through the downtown core. Several businesses were targeted at different points of the day; however, there was no property damage or serious disruption of normal activity.

Later in the day, a protest started at Westlake Mall. Originally, the group size was estimated at 30. In half an hour, this group had grown in size until they were described as "taking up the entire block." Some protesters from this group successfully entered the Convention Center main floor area. This group was active for about 90 minutes before dispersing.

Saturday, November 27, 1999

Demonstration activity on Saturday was limited. Three people were arrested for rappelling over a wall and hanging an anti-WTO banner along the I-5 freeway. Approximately 25 people followed officers to the jail to protest the arrests but soon dispersed without incident. Later in the evening, 40 people established a demonstration "headquarters" at 4th Avenue and East Denny.

Saturday evening, SPD commanders met with protest leaders in what was the first of many negotiations that occurred during the conference over the course of the conference.

Sunday, November 28, 1999

On Sunday, there were two events unrelated to the Conference requiring a sizable deployment of traffic management resources. The first was the Seattle Marathon, starting at 0500 hours and concluding at around noon. The second event was a Seahawks football game which was scheduled for a 1300 hours start in the Kingdome and included a pre-game "tailgate party" inside the Stadium Exhibition Center (site of the Monday evening WTO social event). Both events were monitored closely and were trouble-free.

However, several WTO related protest gatherings were observed throughout the day, most notably a gathering on the campus of Seattle Central Community College (SCCC) on Capitol Hill around 1130 hours. This group grew from an estimated size of 200 to about 500 by 1300 hours. This group began a non-permitted march northbound on Broadway escorted by East Precinct officers as traffic monitors. At 1340 hours, a clerk at the Fred Meyer store on Broadway reported that protestors purchased all of the lighter fluid in that store. Shortly thereafter this event, a portion of the group, numbering about 400, indicated they were going to march on the Downtown Gap store and shut it down.

As the protesters moved downtown, they were monitored closely by demonstration management officers. Several retail stores closed their businesses at the approach of the protest. After an hour of blocking the street and other disruptive activities which did not result in arrest, the group demanded a police escort back to SCCC. This was accomplished and the protestors eventually dispersed in the Capitol Hill neighborhood.

At 1830 hours, Seattle Police began staffing the Convention Center venue. The Secret Service and military K-9 teams conducted a security sweep of the building that was completed about 0300 hours Monday. A short time later, an officer discovered a construction door that appeared to have been forced. This discovery necessitated another four-hour search of the building, delaying the opening of the Convention Center to press and delegates until 1000 hours.

At 2220 hours, a group of protestors broke into the abandoned Kalberer Building at 914 Virginia Street. Police attempted to gain the cooperation of the protestors in the building but were unsuccessful. With the priority being staffing of WTO venue security and traffic management, the Incident Commander decided not to attempt to clear the building and instead chose to monitor the takeover activities. The risk of diverting personnel to contain, arrest, and process trespassers was secondary to maintaining the readiness of crowd management platoons and SWAT resources. All utilities to 914 & 918 Virginia were shut off in an attempt to discourage occupancy. (See Appendix G)

Monday, November 29, 1999

On Monday, the size and intensity of protests increased. The Sierra Club held a permitted march in the early afternoon that drew several thousand people; however, there were few problems with that march. Throughout the day, various groups would converge, protest, and then disperse only to reassemble later at another location. This was a pattern that occurred throughout the conference and presented significant tactical challenges to police commanders. The protesters were establishing a fluid, dynamic method of operation that consisted of rapid deployment and the use of non-criminal protestors to buffer smaller pockets of protestors engaging in significant criminal acts.

The largest and most violent of these impromptu demonstrations occurred about 1330 hours. Several hundred demonstrators marched to the McDonalds at 3rd and Pine, broke windows, and spray painted graffiti on the building before marching away toward the freeway. A bicyclist rode ahead of them, radioing police locations to the crowd.

Believing that the marchers might try to enter the freeway, police were authorized to use chemical irritants if necessary to prevent entry. Various people in the protest group donned chemical agent protective masks (Again, this reflected the level of sophistication present among the various protest groups. A portion of the demonstrators possessed equipment designed to resist or protect the wearer from the effects of chemical irritants used by the police).

Individuals in this same group became aggressive when they arrived at Niketown. Part of the crowd argued for taking over Niketown. Officers moved in and formed a perimeter around the store, then issued orders to disperse to the crowd. Protestors were urged by a person with access to a microphone to "*Keep it peaceful today. Today is not the day to break windows. Wait until tomorrow.*" A confrontation was avoided when police negotiated with the leaders and offered an escort if the demonstration remained peaceful. The crowd moved away and soon dispersed

At 1830 hours, two planned marches, one a church group of several thousand, and the other a labor group of several hundred, marched from downtown and converged at the Stadium Exhibition Center, the site of the WTO opening social reception. Upon arrival at the Exhibition Center, the crowd became vocal and pushed against the fencing but did not force it down. "Protesters" on the east side of the Exhibition Hall threw rocks and directed laser pointers at officers. In an effort to maintain a peaceful event, the Field Incident Commander asked protest organizers from the AFL-CIO to urge the crowd to remain peaceful. Both individuals used patrol car public address systems to convey the message, but were drowned out by the crowd. Following the march, the labor group was transported to the Key Arena where it conducted a rally. Due to Seattle Police

staffing shortages, King County Sheriff's deputies provided security for the Key Arena event.

Although there were several arrests made on Monday, it appeared that most protest groups were avoiding confrontations with police that would likely result in their arrest. Leaders of one of the larger recognized anti-WTO groups met with police commanders and attempted to negotiate the peaceful arrest of up to 1,000 protestors Tuesday near the Convention Center. The protest organizers were told this was not possible.

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

At 0200 hours anti-WTO groups quietly assembled in several locations within walking distance of the Convention Center. In response, the night venue commander mobilized the 1st Watch Task Force.

At 0530 hours, police detected the largest of these groups assembling in Victor Steinbrueck Park. Officers observed members of this group unloading components for bipods and tripods. These items are used for linking people together, thereby preventing their removal from streets and intersections. Given the probable use of this equipment, officers were directed by the Incident Commander to seize these items in the interest of public safety. The group continued to grow in size, and police noted that many were equipped with chemical agent protective masks and canisters resembling chemical munitions. The task force commander withdrew officers from the park as many of his personnel were not equipped with chemical agent protective masks.

The daytime Field Incident Commander returned to duty and relieved the night Venue Commander. The task force personnel were reassigned to crowd management duties. These officers could not be afforded rest or meal periods, despite the fact they had been on station for numerous hours by this time. Additionally, the delivery of food, water, radio batteries or other necessary supplies was inadequate. This situation would worsen as the day and week progressed.

At 0730 hours, the Victor Steinbrueck Park group began marching east on Pike Street, ultimately taking up positions along Sixth Avenue at the intersections of Pike, Union, and University streets. At the same time, another group approached the Paramount Theater from the north, occupying the intersections at 7th and Pine, 8th and Pine, and the area outside the line of buses that had been staged by police to form a security perimeter for the Paramount at 9th and Pine. A third group approached from the east and occupied the intersections of Boren and Pine, Boren and Pike, and Terry and Pike. A fourth group came from the south and occupied the intersections at 8th and Seneca, and Hubble Place and

Seneca. Another group estimated at 1,000 marched from Seattle Central Community College, adding to the strength of the other groups.

This well-coordinated early morning protest action with groups converging from multiple directions quickly surpassed the capacity of police to simultaneously maintain access to the Convention Center and make arrests. Among the criminal tactics used by protestors to seize and hold their positions were the following:

- Stealing security fencing and erecting it to close streets
- Setting fires in the street
- Chaining themselves to various objects and to each other
- Moving dumpsters and other objects into the street and rolling them toward officer lines
- Bringing large pieces of concrete to the scene and dumping them onto the street
- Erecting platforms and stages in the streets
- “Lockdown” of 14 intersections simultaneously by filling them with people
- Using bipods and tripods to block traffic

Locations near the key venues that had been planned in advance for demonstrations, in response to protest group requests, were very seldom, if ever, used during the WTO Conference. (See Appendix H for Boundary Maps)

In the 30 minutes from 0730 to 0800 hours, 7 distinct, large-scale criminal disturbances occurred within a 2 block radius of the Convention Center as reported by officers in the field:

- 8th & Seneca – large disturbance with people chaining themselves to manholes and setting items on fire.
- Convention Center – people observed carrying bottles filled with flammable liquids.
- Eastbound on Olive – people pushing a dumpster
- 6th & Pike – 65-100 protestors lying in the street
- Boren & Pike – people attacking moving cars and fighting and possible property damage
- 8th & Seneca – 100 protestors jumping on cars
- 9th & Olive – protestors putting chains across the intersection – light post to light post

By 0800, the demonstrators had succeeded in cutting off vehicular access to the Convention Center and Paramount Theater. Additionally, the number of protestors in the area completely eliminated the possibility of any coordinated enforcement activity. Given the possibility that protestors might attempt to enter and/or occupy key Conference facilities, the Field Incident Commander in charge of demonstration management forces requested and quickly received a lock down of the Convention Center and Sheraton Hotel venues. Reports of protest

and criminal activity were received from officers and through the 911 reporting system:

- 0802 hours: 500 protestors about to breach Paramount perimeter.
- 0804 hours: Joint Information Center reporting crowd beating on Niketown windows.
- 0805 hours: SPD radio reporting windows being broken at Niketown.
- 0807 hours: Pine & Boren 1000 people in the intersection setting up objects.
- 0818 hours: 8th & Stewart 100 people committing property damage.
- 0823 hours: 5th & Olive, 1400 block 4th Ave.– objects thrown at officers.
- 0828 hours: Report of windows being broken at Nordstrom.
- 0839 hours: Boren & Pike, 8th & Seneca – protestors masking up.
- 0843 hours: Sheraton Hotel – crowd throwing debris and forming up at hotel front doors.
- 0846 hours: Report of crowd “taking over” a Starbuck’s.
- 0848 hours: Sheraton venue commander reports delegates being assaulted, property damage and that he’s losing control of the situation. “Peacekeeper” SWAT armored personnel vehicle responds. Protestors donning chemical irritant protective masks.
- 0912 hours: 9th & Pine – Metro sheltering delegates; requesting rescue.
- 0917 hours: Sheraton – delegates being assaulted near the west side of the hotel.
- 0920 hours: Protestor sprays 13 officers with chemical irritant.
- 0922 hours: 6th & Union – 20 delegates surrounded. (Throughout the day, officers rescued delegates who had been forced to seek refuge inside other buildings.)

It is important to keep in mind that the above activity was taking place *within* the larger body of protestors, most of whom were non-violent. At 0909 hours, because of the above described activity and the resultant potential for life-threatening situations and in order to clear a path for safe access to the Convention Center, the Field Incident Commander authorized the use of chemical irritants . At 0910 hours, a call for emergency mutual aid was placed to allied agencies. By this time it was apparent the police could not guarantee the safety of delegates as they moved from venue to venue, and at 0930 hours, an order was passed through the Seattle Host Organization to keep all delegates in their hotels until order was restored.

Between 0915 and 1000 hours, in accordance with the plan, the Incident Commander ordered that a path be cleared on Union and University Streets from the Convention Center to 2nd Avenue. Two demonstration management platoons were tasked with clearing Union and University streets. Bull horns were used to give repeated orders to disperse over a 45-minute period, but refused to comply. At 1003 hours, chemical irritants were applied at 6th and Union to achieve the goal of opening Union Street. Chemical irritants were applied on University at 6th shortly thereafter. As the streets were cleared, demonstration management

personnel, including allied agencies, were tasked with holding cleared intersections and soon were all engaged in maintaining the open corridor to 4th Avenue. During this operation, officers observed protestors being coordinated and directed through the use of cell phones and “walkie-talkies”. As the day went on, it was clear the protestors were re-deploying in response to police presence at a particular intersection. Using this tactic, groups of “protesters” were able to commit numerous crimes at varied locations with reduced fear of police apprehension:

- 1013 hours: 5th & Pike – people breaking windows
- 1016 hours: 3rd & Pine – McDonald’s windows being broken
- 1017 hours: Sheraton command requesting delegate rescue. Officers being struck by thrown debris.
- 1021 hours: Delegates rescued and debris throwing stopped.
- 1023-1030 hours: Chemical irritants applied at 6th & University. There were reports of individual officers running out of chemical irritants.
- 1026 hours: People with sledgehammers at 4th & Union.
- 1120 hours: It became clear that there were not enough officers to hold both streets open. The Incident Commander made the decision to open and hold only Union Street bringing officers from University to assist.
- 1131 hours: 6 to 8 thousand people moving toward 6th & Union in an unpermitted march.

Throughout the day, whenever attempts were made to clear an area using chemical irritants and/or other less lethal munitions, verbal warnings were first given (except in emergencies such as when an aid car or other emergency vehicle/personnel was required to immediately access the area.) After verbal warnings were provided and ignored, chemical irritants in conjunction with less lethal munitions were deployed on an as needed basis. On numerous occasions, chemical agent canisters were thrown back at the police.

In most instances, officers providing security at venues were unable to leave their posts to pursue and apprehend criminal suspects. The Convention Center and associated venues were considered the equivalent of a foreign embassy for the duration of the event, thereby requiring heightened security to insure the safety of dignitaries and heads of state attending the conference. Additionally, the size and demeanor of the crowds required making the decision to focus demonstration management on maintaining a perimeter and creating a security corridor for Conference delegates. This precluded officers from making individual arrests, and instead required focusing on dispersal of the crowd.

Several permitted marches were conducted and escorted without incident by traffic management platoons. These events, together with their approximate start times and number of marchers, included:

- 0900 hours, 1,000 Sierra Club marchers proceeded from Denny Park to the Seattle Center.

- 0930 hours, 500 University of Washington students marched from their campus to the Seattle Center.
- 1000 hours, a group of 500 marched from the Seattle Central Community College campus to the Seattle Center.
- 1200 hours, a group of 1,000 Tibetan Rights and Taiwanese Association marchers proceeded from Denny Park to 4th and Denny.

Most of these marchers later joined the largest march of the day, which was organized by the AFL-CIO. Police estimated the size of this march in excess of 40,000. Several streets along the planned route were blocked by demonstrators, so a modified, alternate route for the march was employed. This march left the Seattle Center at 1214 hours with 20,000 people. The plan for this march required the deployment of 119 police personnel, both roving and fixed posts, to insure that the traffic route was clear. While the majority of people in this march followed the alternate route and dispersed following the march, several thousand of the marchers broke from the route and continued into the downtown core in the vicinity of the Pike Street area where these added numbers exacerbated the problems already occurring there.

While the permitted parade was occurring, criminal activity continued in the downtown core:

- 1323 hours: 5th & Pine -- looters in the Starbuck's.
- 1358 hours: 5th & Union – 7 patrol cars were disabled with all tires flattened.
- 1404 hours: Seneca & Hubbell Place – report of delegates being pushed around by protestors.
- 1428 hours: 3rd & Pike – people throwing barricades through windows.

The size of the disruptive protests and their attendant level of violence and property destruction increased throughout the day. Available police resources were unable to quell the disturbance and prevent the destruction of property. In response to this situation and based on the recommendations of police commanders, the Mayor declared a Civil Emergency at 1532 hours. The Proclamation of Civil Emergency included an Emergency Order imposing a curfew with criminal sanctions and allowing for arrests of curfew violators. The curfew included the area bounded by Denny Way on the north, Yesler Way on the south, the I-5 freeway on the east, and Elliott Bay on the west, and was in effect between 1900 hours Tuesday and 0730 hours Wednesday. Shortly after the Mayor's action, the Governor authorized deployment of the National Guard.

On Tuesday afternoon, commanders of the Museum of Flight (MOF) venue in Tukwila found that many of the personnel slated to work their evening venue had been committed in the downtown core of Seattle to assist with the demonstrations. Alternative personnel were identified from responding mutual aid agencies and were assigned to the MOF event. Demonstrations in the downtown core had the effect of reducing attendance at the Museum of Flight venue, where no disruptive activity occurred.

At approximately 1545 hours, large crowds at 4th and Pike and 6th and Pike turned violent. Numerous acts of property damage, looting, and assaults on police were committed. Officers were pelted with sticks, bottles, traffic cones, empty chemical irritant canisters, and other debris. Some protesters used their own chemical irritants against police, and a large fire was set in the intersection at 4th and Pike. Attempts were made to utilize one of the prominent protest organizers to calm and move the crowd -- but the effort was futile. For the remainder of the afternoon, police used chemical irritants in an attempt to disperse the unruly crowds.

Shortly thereafter, self-proclaimed "legal observers" approached officers in the area of 6th and Pike and asked the officers if they were aware of protesters chained to the sewer grates at that intersection. They wanted the officers to understand that if they attempted to move the crowd, the chained protesters would be trampled. A Platoon Commander stated that he would not allow the looting of the Niketown located on the northeast corner of 6th and Pike (it was under siege at that time and the employees were evacuated). In response, the protest group formed a line in front of the Niketown windows, attempting to prevent looters from gaining entry to the store. After a short while, the protest organizer notified the platoon commander that they could no longer prevent entry into Niketown. The protest organizer was asked to have the people chained to the sewer grates leave, because officers would soon be taking action to prevent the takeover and looting of Niketown. The protesters complied with the request and officers were able to secure the site and continue to disperse the crowd.

For approximately the next hour, officers attempted to quell significant acts of vandalism, property damage, looting, and assaults on citizens as well as police, throughout the downtown core.

The crowd at Niketown presented an on-going violent threat. The crowd was large, and continually engaged in assaults on officers. It was determined that the crowd needed to be moved from the downtown core. Orders to disperse were issued to the crowd. Upon their failure to comply, officers deployed chemical irritants and less lethal munitions resulting in the crowd's dispersal to the north and west from 6th and Pike. At 1840 hours, it was reported that the crowd was pulling the driver of a garbage truck from his vehicle and assaulting him at 6th and Stewart. Officers were deployed to rescue the driver and the intersections were cleared and secured. Remaining officers continued to disperse the crowd.

As the crowd moved, approximately half continued north and the remainder turned east on Pine Street. The crowd that moved to the east numbered in the hundreds, possibly 600 to 800, and remained a cohesive group. They broke signs and damaged vehicles as they moved along. Officers followed the group over the freeway where the Assistant Platoon Commander ordered officers to maintain a line on the eastside of the Pine Street overpass to protect the I-5

corridor below. The crowd stopped one block east of the established line and began assaulting officers with rocks, ball bearings, and bottles. The platoon commander, calling the situation "Pine Street Command," began formulating a plan: to encircle the protestors and to make a mass arrest. However, before the plan could be executed, the platoon was dispatched to the East Precinct where the precinct itself was being threatened by mounting protest activity.

While the Niketown crowd's eastward movement occurred, the Field Incident Commander met with officers from allied agencies at the Public Safety Building and briefed them on the plan to clear the downtown core in preparation for the curfew. After the briefing concluded at about 1845 hours, officers formed a line from 1st Avenue to 5th Avenue on Cherry and moved north to Virginia Street. They dispersed the crowd and notified them of the curfew perimeter.

By 2100 hours, at Summit & Howell Streets, officers that were part of the multi-agency command at that location were in great danger of being assaulted and injured, given the topography and the aggression of the rioters facing them. On at least three occasions, the platoons attempted to disengage from the crowd and return to a position nearer the downtown core. Each time the platoons attempted to disengage, the rioters reconstituted and followed the officers -- throwing rocks, bottles, golf balls, and firing incendiary devices at them. Similar disturbances occurred simultaneously at other locations in the area -- notably, Bellevue and Pike St., and Melrose and Pine St.

There was ongoing activity with the crowd east of I-5 between the hours of 2130 and 0330. The crowd moved to the Broadway area and refused to disperse despite numerous verbal warnings and applications of chemical irritants. This level of intensity continued until after midnight. From midnight until 0200 hours, officers held their positions on Broadway. Buses then transported officers back to the staging area in preparation for the 0700 hours roll call. Allied agency officers remained until approximately 0330 hours, when the 1st Watch Task Force was deployed.

It is important to note that President Clinton arrived at the Westin Hotel between 0130 and 0230 hours.

Wednesday, December 1st, 1999

Activity began early Wednesday morning, with the night Tactical Commander being detailed to the Kingdome to brief allied agencies on perimeter staffing assignments. As officers from other agencies arrived, they were deployed according to plan. The actual perimeter was:

- 4th Ave. and Lenora, south on 4th Ave. to Seneca St.
- East on Seneca St. to I-5
- North on Boren Ave. to Pine St.

- West on Pine St. to 6th Ave.
- North on 6th Ave. to Lenora St.
- West on Lenora to 4th Ave.

Around 0500 hours, First Watch Task Force officers patrolling within the perimeter observed people carrying such items as: crowbars, bipods and tripods (See Glossary), masonry hammers, and rocks. Some of these items were confiscated.

As two of the demonstration management platoons returned to duty, protesters began to gather on Lenora Street, and in Denny Park. Protesters then entered the police perimeter and were blocking streets near Westlake and Olive. Orders to disperse were given and ignored by the crowd. Arrests ensued and approximately 90 individuals were taken into custody just before 0800 hours.

By 0830 hours a group of 100 protesters began moving westward from 7th and Blanchard and a group of 200 began moving westward from 5th and Lenora.

An hour and a half later, more demonstrators gathered within the perimeter at Westlake Park and officers began making arrests there as well. Busses and arrest teams were requested to assist with taking approximately 200 people into custody.

Within ten minutes, a large crowd at 6th and Pike failed to disperse after being ordered to do so. Chemical irritants were deployed which moved the crowd to 5th and Pike.

The police perimeter was strictly enforced throughout the morning and early afternoon to insure secure travel for the President. He was escorted between several venues (the Westin Hotel, the Bell Harbor Conference Center, a Port of Seattle facility on Harbor Island and the Four Seasons Hotel) while officers continued to encounter highly mobile, aggressive, and hostile protesters in the downtown core.

At mid-morning, the Incident Commander was informed that the American Civil Liberties Union filed for a temporary restraining order in U.S. District Court seeking to overturn Civil Emergency Order #3 -- the police perimeter declaration. A police commander was tasked with summarizing the department's need for designating the police perimeter to ensure a restoration of order. The court denied the request for the restraining order, which left the police perimeter intact.

By mid-afternoon, a group of protesters congregated in the 1400 and 1500 blocks of 2nd and 3rd Avenues. Protesters caused property damage, threw debris, blocked the street, and trapped citizens in their cars. Vehicular traffic was brought to a standstill. A verbal order to disperse was given, and when it was clear that the order was being ignored, chemical irritants were deployed,

dispersing the crowd. A line of officers was formed on Pike St. from 1st Avenue to 3rd Avenue.

A splinter group of 400 to 500 protesters moved north to 1st and Clay St, causing property damage and blocking traffic en route. The crowd eventually stopped, but did not disperse. Continuing criminal acts resulted in approximately 250 arrests.

Another group from the 1st and Pike St. area eventually sat down in the intersection of 3rd and Pine Street, remaining seated in the intersection until the curfew took effect.

The night Field Incident Commander returned to duty at 1800 hours as a crowd of 600 to 1000 demonstrators moved eastbound on Denny Way toward the east precinct. Police personnel were instructed to shadow and monitor the protest group, avoiding contact if possible. Another group on Broadway began vandalizing windows as more protesters joined them. The East Precinct Commander requested reinforcements to protect the facility. Task Force officers and night SWAT were deployed to the precinct as requested.

A Platoon Commander leaving the area of the East Precinct observed a disruptive crowd milling around the area of Broadway Avenue and Pine Street and attempted to clear the area. Some from the crowd jumped on his car and began rocking it by the light bar while others lay in front of the patrol vehicle, preventing it from moving as he was besieged by the crowd. Chemical irritants were deployed to break up the riotous group.

A few minutes later, the riotous group on Broadway Avenue was dispersed. The crowd stayed far enough ahead of the officers to avoid a direct confrontation and the officers successfully moved the crowd through the business district to East Roy. The night Field Incident Commander instructed the officers to return south on Broadway, where Platoon Commanders would split their resources to cover a block on each side of Broadway as well as Broadway itself. During the officers movement south on Broadway, people threw unopened soup cans, bottles, and other items at them from rooftops.

In the area of Broadway and Thomas, at around 2145 hours, an officer reported seeing someone dressed in black clothing carrying a molotov cocktail.

About fifteen minutes later, the Night Field Incident Commander began relieving daytime demonstration management for the second time that evening. Shortly thereafter, a group of 300 to 400 people moved from Broadway to the 1100 block of East Pine. The Night Field Incident Commander believed the individuals were monitoring police radio channels and a mutual aid request was made because there were insufficient resources remaining to protect the East Precinct. A perimeter was established around the precinct and numerous dispersal orders were given to the crowd. As officers defended the perimeter around the East

Precinct, radio dispatchers received information from an employee at the Broadway Chevron Station that people had taken over the station, and were attempting to fill small bottles with gasoline. A mobile unit responded and was able to disperse the crowd.

The crowd descending on the East Precinct grew to a size of 1000 to 1500 by 2315 hours and attempted to breach the perimeter on several occasions. Officers were assaulted with rocks, debris, and other projectiles from the crowd.

Thursday, December 2, 1999

The East Precinct remained under siege until 0250 hours. In order to disperse the rioters, use of chemical irritants and less lethal munitions was required. At 0300 hours, order was restored and the mutual aid and task force resources were released.

Thursday saw a significant de-escalation in demonstration activities. The police perimeter was fully staffed and successfully kept unauthorized persons out of the area throughout the day. Having sufficient resources to maintain a secure perimeter allowed police to escort and monitor non-permitted demonstrations outside the perimeter in a manner consistent with permitted demonstrations.

At about 0830 hours, a group of demonstrators began gathering for a march from Seattle Central Community College (SCCC) to Victor Steinbrueck Park.

After the President left town at approximately 1000 hours, the size and necessity of the police perimeter was reevaluated. The northern perimeter boundary was moved south to Pine Street without incident as soon as the President left town.

The group of about 1,000 people at SCCC held a rally at about 1300 hours and then marched to Victor Steinbrueck Park -- heading southbound on 4th Avenue. At the 4th & University perimeter, the Field Incident Commander negotiated with protest leaders to allow the group to walk to the King County Jail, circle it for an hour and then disband. They encircled the jail and remained, causing a lockdown of the jail.

A group of about 150 met at SCCC around 1645 hours to begin an impromptu march.

The crowd at the jail split at approximately 1935 hours with half going up to Broadway with a police escort, and half remaining at the jail. The remainder of the evening was uneventful with officers monitoring the group at the jail and other small roving groups.

Friday, December 3, 1999

The main event on Friday was an organized labor march. Protest organizers negotiated with the Mayor's Office, King County Executive, and police commanders, reaching an agreement to allow entry into the single block on the northwest corner of the perimeter. Police determined that keeping this single block within the perimeter was no longer essential to maintaining access for WTO delegates. Orders were given to move the northwest perimeter boundary one block south and one block east to coincide with the desired protest route. The new perimeter was reinforced to prevent a breach.

At 1300 hours, the march proceeded from the Labor Temple in the 2800 block of Clay Street to 5th and Pike Street. They lingered before marching on, leaving about 500 people behind. As the marchers returned to the labor hall, another group broke off and went to the Westin Hotel, where numerous protesters chained themselves to the front door. Another group proceeded to the King County Jail where they held a vigil and demanded the release of those previously arrested. Many of the people protesting at the Westin later joined the group at the jail.

The WTO meetings concluded at about 2230 hours on Friday night. At 0200 hours Saturday, the Washington State Patrol forces were relieved, followed by National Guard troops at 0600 hours.

The other major event on this day was the interaction between the Seattle Police and the trespassers who were occupying the Kalberer building at 914 Virginia Street. (See Appendix G)

Saturday, December 4, 1999

Saturday proved to be uneventful. The SPOC and MACC ceased operations at noon. SPD's two demonstration management platoons worked until 1600 hours.

WTO Conference Impacts

This section of the after action report provides information on the significant safety-related impacts of the Conference: arrests and criminal charges; estimated property damage; injuries to both citizens and police; and costs to the City of Seattle and other jurisdictions participating in the WTO Public Safety Committee.

Arrests and Criminal Charges

Based on a tally of jail booking sheets, the SPD Records and Identification Section reports that a total of 601 arrests were made during the WTO Conference. The vast majority of these were for obstruction of traffic, failure to disperse, and similar criminal activities and were made after repeated police warnings. The largest number of those arrested, nearly 300, were Seattle residents; more than 100, using aliases such as "John" or "Jane WTO," were still unidentified two weeks after the Conference. All but a handful of those arrested were released on their own recognizance by the end of the weekend following the Conference.

In the aftermath of the Conference, SPD established a special WTO Crimes Task Force to investigate felony crimes related to the Conference. The Investigations Bureau reviewed the 601 cases noted above, as well as attempts to identify additional lawbreakers who caused substantial damage to business properties in the Downtown area.

As of February 18, 2000, the Task Force had identified 34 individuals suspected of crimes in connected with the WTO Conference. Of these 34 individuals, 31 were referred to the King County Prosecutor, and 26 of the 29 suspects have been charged with felony crimes, most involving malicious mischief or burglary. The other five suspects were referred to the Seattle City Attorney for misdemeanor offenses involving malicious mischief or property destruction. All of the 34 suspects have been arrested, four during Conference (part of the 601) and the remaining 30 subsequent to the Conference.

In summary, 631 arrests were made during or subsequent to the Conference, and 26 suspects have been charged with felonies. A number of cases are still pending. The Seattle City Attorney stated in early January the intent to pursue misdemeanor charges against 51 individuals who had been arrested [*Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, January 6, 2000].

Property Damage

The *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* reported on December 8, 1999 that downtown businesses sustained an estimated \$3 million in property damage as a result of criminal conduct associated with the WTO Conference. Damage to storefronts in the form of broken glass, damaged window displays, and graffiti was apparent throughout the downtown core. Niketown, Old Navy, Levi's, Carroll's Jewelry, U.S. Bank, Starbucks, McDonald's, and Radio Shack all sustained significant property damage. In addition, some retailers experienced significant losses when vandals were followed by looters. Public spaces such as Westlake Park also experienced considerable damage from graffiti, and streets were heavily littered with refuse and the remains of fires set in overturned dumpsters.

Seattle Public Utilities and Seatran, joined by businesses and scores of private volunteers anxious to restore the area for the Holiday shopping season, responded immediately after the event to initiate the cleanup process.

The Downtown Seattle Association estimated that retailers suffered an estimated \$17 million in lost sales during the five days of the WTO Conference, which occurred during the busiest shopping season of the year. By late December, however, it appeared that much if not all of this loss had been recovered. According to the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, through December 19, same-store sales in Seattle were up 5.6 percent over the prior year, compared with 5.7 percent elsewhere in the West and 5.8 percent nationally [*Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 22, 1999*]

Injuries

Considering the intensity of the demonstrations and protests that occurred in Seattle during the WTO Conference, there were relatively few injuries. No serious injuries or deaths were reported. Based on the records of area hospitals, the Seattle Fire Department reports that 92 individuals went to local hospitals for emergency treatment. The vast majority of these individuals were treated for symptoms related to the inhalation of chemical irritants, either pepper spray or CS gas. A smaller number were treated for contusions and, in one case, a broken arm. The lack of serious injuries to protesters may be attributed to the use of chemical irritants to less lethal munitions rather than hand-to-hand contact with officers.

Law enforcement officers also reported few injuries as a result of the WTO Conference. SPD experienced the largest number of these injuries, with 56 officers filing injury reports. The largest number of these, 17 officers, complained

of hearing impairment; 12 officers complained of strained backs and bruises sustained in handling uncooperative protesters. One serious injury reported was a burned hand sustained by an officer who was burned by the premature ignition of a chemical irritant canister.

SPD after-action interviews with mutual aid police agencies indicated that no serious injuries were sustained by supporting agencies' personnel; only a few of the two dozen agencies interviewed reported any injuries at all and none required medical treatment. Redmond Police reported two cases of possible food poisoning; the remaining medical reports involved bruises sustained by objects thrown by protesters.

Public Agency Costs

As of late January 2000, direct costs incurred by the City of Seattle stood at approximately \$9.3 million. Based on incomplete data, the City's partner jurisdictions and agencies experienced costs in the vicinity of \$6 million. King County and the Washington State Patrol had the largest costs among the allied jurisdictions and agencies, with each reporting costs in the vicinity of \$2.3 million. For all agencies, overtime personnel costs appeared to be the single largest category of expenditure; costs incurred during field deployment for the WTO Conference clearly exceeded costs incurred for planning.

Not surprisingly, the costs reported by the Seattle Police Department exceeded those of all other City agencies combined, \$6.9 to \$2.4 million. (See Appendix I) The costs documented by police as of January 24, 2000 were as follows:

| Item | Dollar Cost | Percentage |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|
| Personnel | \$5,768,051 | 83.9% |
| Equipment & Supplies | 840,317 | 12.2 |
| Capital Costs | 112,675 | 1.7 |
| Other Logistical Costs | 151,808 | 2.2 |
| Totals | \$6,872,851 | 100.0% |

Indirect costs in defense and settlement of any legal suits brought against the City as a result WTO-related claims are not included in the above figures. As of January 25, 2000, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* reported that 27 damage claims had been filed, with claims ranging widely from \$150 to \$68 million. The City Attorney will examine these claims and recommend action.

Lessons Learned: Planning

P1 - Issue:

Planning time was short. Ordinary lead time for a scheduled significant international event or convention is 14-24 months according to the Department of State and historical precedent.

P1 - Recommendation:

The role of SPD is to assess and advise the City of project lead time requirements at the earliest possible moment. Adequate lead time is essential for mission success. If lead time is assessed to be inadequate the Police Department must advise the Executive.

P-2 Issue:

While the City provided adequate budget support for SPD, the lack of an outside funding source to reimburse Mutual aid agencies influenced the decisions of the Incident Commander against requesting full-time planning and operational resources from allied agencies.

P-2 Recommendation:

Following the model of the Goodwill Games planning process, the ideal approach to major event planning and operations is to secure sufficient funding for reimbursement to all mutual aid agencies. Additionally, allocate funding for full-time personnel to staff an integrated planning group with representatives of all impacted agencies. In the case of the Goodwill Games, the budget for reimbursement was established and controlled by the State.

P3 - Issue:

While the Planning Group and Subcommittee structure worked well to create collaboration and involvement of necessary agencies, the absence of funding and the lack of contractual commitments led to last minute decision-making and informal agreements.

P3 - Recommendation:

See recommendation P2. With the realization of funding for planning, operations and reimbursement, a formal integrated planning effort can be implemented. The planning model should consist of dedicated full time planning personnel representing all impacted agencies; written agreements, memoranda and contracts defining all deployments and operations; and an integrated review

process for decisions concerning planning, deployment and command.

P4 - Issue:

The process of planning review was informal. While allied agencies were represented on the planning subcommittees, there was no formal process for plan acceptance. Consequently, acceptance or objections to the plan were not documented.

P4 - Recommendation:

Continuing the theme of recommendation P3, a formal process requiring review and written approval by all agencies as the plan is developed is required. To illustrate by historical example, the Goodwill Games plan was developed by the Integrated Police Planning Group, representing full-time planners from 12 local, state and federal agencies; the plan was presented to the task force commanders (Major-Assistant Chiefs) of each involved agency, who individually reviewed and acknowledged approval in writing; the plan was then presented to the Chiefs/Sheriffs/SAICs of each involved agency, who individually acknowledged approval in writing; the plan was finally forwarded to the executive of each involved jurisdiction. Delegation of authority was not permitted. This kind of thorough system of review, written acceptance, and check and balance is only possible with adequate funding for planning and operations.

P5 - Issue:

The operations plan did not provide for coordination and controlled deployment of incoming Mutual aid assets.

P5 - Recommendation:

Include a contingency plan for deployment of Mutual aid assets to include reception, staging, and integration into ongoing operations. The operations center must control staging, transportation and deployment of incoming agencies. The model for this system is the Washington State Fire Services Resource Mobilization Plan which was

established under the authority of RCW 38.54. Standardization ensures uniform structure and greater coordination in Mutual aid responses.

P 6 - Issue:

Major event plans greatly benefit from outside review and critique.

P 6 – Recommendation:

Include sufficient time and a mechanism for the review of the plan by law enforcement experts and consultants, who have experience in special event management. This review must be governed by the requirements for confidentiality, and all consultants should sign confidentiality waivers prior to accessing documents or advising the City or Police Department.

P 7 - Issue:

While the WTO plan included progressive deployments and addressed contingencies such as mutual aid and the possibility of National Guard call-out, the planning for contingencies did not go deep enough.

P 7 – Recommendation:

All planning should be centered upon a progression of escalating contingencies, or tiers of potential response. Planners should consider:

- Request for Federal intervention
- Appropriateness of venues
- Creating hardened perimeters around key sites
- Recommend canceling individual events
- Recommend canceling event

Plans for these contingencies should be detailed and each should include command and control systems, logistics, provision for relief and meals, systems to coordinate, track and deploy arriving assets, etc. These tiers should be identified as early as possible and communicated to all impacted law enforcement and governmental executives and councils. Commanders should ensure “worst case” scenarios are included in planning.

P8-Issue:

Use of the Internet and other high speed methods of communication represented a new medium for coordination of violent or criminal activity.

P8 – Recommendation:

Focus and expertise needs to be developed and dedicated to the use of the Internet and other technologies as a communication and intelligence tool.

P9 – Issue:

Intelligence assessments were not integrated into the planning process in a timeframe that allowed the depth of comprehensive contingency planning identified in recommendation P7.

P9 – Recommendation:

It is necessary to carefully assess the importance of preliminary intelligence information, with appropriate caveats, and for commanders to use this information to identify and plan for the full range of contingencies to include “worst-case” scenarios.

P10 - Issue:

While contingency plans for supplies and resources were in place, the reliance on informal agreements resulted in delays.

P10 - Recommendation:

Written memoranda of agreement to provide personnel services or resources with outside agencies and vendors need to be executed during the planning phase.

P11-Issue:

The dynamic and rapidly changing character of modern protest activity sometimes resulted in law enforcement being one-step behind those committed to unlawful behavior.

P11 Recommendation:

In addition to the obvious need for the plan to be flexible and quick to adapt in general, there should be a dedicated component or team integrated into the planning unit that tracks and is responsive to late-breaking developments or changes in the event dynamic.

P12 – Issue:

Criminal acts and riots extended into late night hours when they were not anticipated.

P12 – Recommendation:

Contingency planning should include options for sustained operations.

P13 - Issue:

Prisoner processing was under-staffed

P13 – Recommendation:

Establish a prisoner processing sub-

and the procedures/protocol proved ineffective.

committee which develops a workable protocol:

- Equipment
- Procedure
- Staffing Model
- Training

This protocol must include contingency plans to immediately increase staffing according to situational needs.

P14 - Issue:

The accreditation mission was undefined, constantly changing, and poorly coordinated.

P14 - Recommendation:

Clearly identify in a written agreement what is to be done, and by what agency, and adhere to the plan.

P15 - Issue:

Planning efforts were hampered by the Investigations Ordinance. Allied agency concerns with the ordinance impacted the amount and timeliness of information made available.

P15 - Recommendation:

Conduct an assessment of the Investigations Ordinance and recommend legislative changes to facilitate future operations.

Lessons Learned: Training

T1 - Issue:

Coordinated multi-agency traffic management training resulted in a high level of escort proficiency, greater dignitary security, and safety for officers.

T1 - Recommendation:

The type of training should be continued in future operations.

T2 - Issue:

Demonstration management training was conducted for all SPD Operations Bureau officers. Those officers conducted crowd control, street clearing, dignitary escort, and other operations. Officers responded positively to this training by holding the line, exercising great restraint, and using only the minimum force necessary to accomplish objectives.

T2 - Recommendation:

Sustain this training by instituting an annual refresher for all Operations Bureau officers.

T3 - Issue:

Chemical Agent Response Team training resulted in the effective and controlled delivery of chemical irritants and less lethal force. This approach resulted in less risk of injury to the law violators and officers.

T3 - Recommendation:

This type of training should be continued and expanded to include Operations personnel to enhance deployment options.

T4 - Issue:

With very few exceptions, allied agencies were not included in

T4 - Recommendation:

Conduct joint training at least annually to establish a standardized regional

demonstration management training.

approach to demo- management.

T5 - Issue:

While the initiation of demonstration management training was commendable, and the quality of the training was excellent, the program itself was nevertheless disjointed, hurried, and not of sufficient duration.

T5 - Recommendation:

Establish a training subcommittee with an officer of sufficient rank who can accomplish Department and regional training goals. The training program should be of sufficient length and depth, and should include a progressive approach to building skill and competency over time, to include a program of regular refreshers.

Lessons Learned: Operations

O1 - Issue:

Personnel movements, adjustments, additions, and relief efforts were not adequately directed, tracked, or coordinated by the Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC).

O1 - Recommendation:

Develop a proficiency with the Incident Command System (ICS) through an on-going training program for Operations Center personnel and department commanders. (See Appendix J for ICS model.)

O2 - Issue:

The SPD Field Incident Commander's span of control was too great to manage and coordinate the area of operations. The Field Incident Commander directed personnel movements, adjustments, and deployments. The Field Incident Commander did not have sufficient support staff to coordinate the wide array of demands at the Field Operational Level.

O2 - Recommendation:

Develop a proficiency with the Incident Command System (ICS) through an on-going training program for Operations Center personnel and department commanders. The Operations Section within ICS readily addresses the direction and coordination of the tactical operation. Additional command support must be provided, and an appropriate span of control established.

O3 - Issue:

As a result establishing two separate media response operations (SPOC and EOC), and the confusion that resulted therefrom, Seattle Police Media Relations Officers were hampered in their attempts to respond directly to the

O3 - Recommendation:

Consistent with the ICS model, centralize the police media relations function to retain the responsibility for dealing with law enforcement related inquires unless the EOC has assumed command of the incident.

media on operational public safety issues.

O4 - Issue:

Allied agencies had difficulty receiving direction in the field because there was no dedicated SPD liaison officer.

O4 - Recommendation:

Develop a proficiency with the Incident Command System (ICS) through an on-going training program for Operations Center personnel. Following the ICS model, the liaison officer would provide assistance and coordination for each agency arriving at the staging area.

O5 - Issue:

Many allied agencies could not communicate by radio with SPOC, with the Field Commander, or with other agencies.

O5 - Recommendation:

In the absence of radio frequency compatibility, incoming agency commanders must be equipped with radios to enable participation in operations.

O6 - Issue:

Despite planning for a "flying squad" to arrest protestors engaging in criminal activity, this concept was unable to be employed during the Operations phase of the Conference.

O6 - Recommendation:

In future operations where there is a potential for disruptive protest, ensure the availability and deployment of teams to arrest law violators intent on disrupting the event.

O7 - Issue:

Some platoons were not assigned Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART).

O7 - Recommendation:

Establish contingency plans to insure adequate mobility and coverage by CART teams and if necessary, increase the number of CART teams to insure adequate coverage.

O8 - Issue:

Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), which generally takes the form of a comprehensive psychological de-

O8 - Recommendation:

Include a comprehensive program of CISM as a priority element of all post-event contingency plans.

brief conducted by professionals and initiated following stressful or traumatic incidents, is a process of paramount importance. While SPD hired a respected professional to conduct a general stress debrief, and has a mechanism for individual counseling and psychological assistance for employees, SPD did not provide a comprehensive CISM effort.

O 9 - Issue:

It is critical to identify issues important to the community (police use-of-force, demonstration management principles, street closures, event impacts) and develop a proactive program of public information.

O 9 - Recommendation:

SPD should work with the community and media to increase understanding of issues relevant to major events, including police use-of-force and demonstration management principles. The involvement of city Public Information Officers (PIOs) is integral to this process.

O 10 - Issue:

SPD lacked a formal after action protocol and provision for capturing operational information from WTO participants immediately after the event.

O 10 - Recommendation:

Develop and implement an after-action protocol.

Lessons Learned: Logistics

L1 - Issue:

Some officers lacked a full issue, personal protective development needed for evolving emergency operations.

L1 - Recommendation:

Insure that every officer has the personal protective equipment to avoid injuries and mission equipment to do the job at hand.

- Impact protection
 - Shin guards
 - Torso and shoulder protection
 - Padded gloves
 - Kevlar helmet and face shield
- Respiratory protection
 - air-purifying respirators
- Communications Equipment
 - Voice amplifiers for masks
 - Ensure battery supply
 - Earpieces for radios
- Clothing
 - Rain ponchos
 - Multiple changes of battle dress uniform (BDU)
- Clear identifiers for both individuals and platoon assignment

L2 - Issue:

Many officers did not receive breaks, food, or water in a timely manner.

L2 - Recommendation:

Plan for relief crews and sustained operations. Decentralize feeding operations. Equip officers with carry-packs for emergency water and food.

L3 - Issue:

Some platoons did not have assigned Emergency Medical Technician support.

L3 - Recommendation:

Assign and train adequate Police Emergency Medical Technicians to each platoon.

L4 - Issue:

Platoons had difficulty getting timely transport for movement from one site to another.

L4 - Recommendation:

Train for movement of squads using vehicles driven by officers.

L5 - Issue:

Platoons and venues had difficulty getting supply requests through heavy radio traffic.

L5 - Recommendation:

Assign a separate frequency for logistics operations.

L6 - Issue:

Command and control of logistics was confusing and disjointed.

L6 - Recommendation:

Establish a logistics subcommittee which is chaired by a lieutenant or captain.

Glossary & Acronyms

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| APEC | Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| Ballistic Helmet | Also called a Riot Helmet, comes with a flip down face shield and is designed to protect officer from thrown or fired projectiles. |
| Bipods | Used to elevate a protester, making them difficult to arrest or move. |
| BOMA | Building Owners and Managers Association |
| CART | Chemical Agent Response Teams |
| Chemical Irritants | Also called "Chemical Agents" and "Gas", chemical irritants are defined as OC, CS and CN gas which are designed to cause short-term but immediate effects on the mucus membranes and are used for the purpose of crowd dispersal and self-defense. |
| CS | Ortho-chlorobenzalmalononitrile manufactured by Def Tec. Often called "Tear Gas" because of the effect it has on the mucus membranes around the eyes. An aerosolized particulate which is non-persistent in an open air application. Its effects are immediate, but remain for only 5-20 minutes after removal from the contaminate atmosphere. |
| EMS | Emergency Medical Services |
| EOC | Emergency Operations Center |
| EOD | Explosive Ordinance Disposal. Often called "Bomb Squad". |
| Gas Mask | Air purifying respirator. Personal protective device used to filter contaminated air of particulates and vapors. |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| HazMat | Hazardous Materials |
| IACP | International Association of Chiefs of Police |
| ICS | Incident Command System |
| JIC | Joint Information Center |
| KCSO | King County Sheriff's Office |
| Less Lethal Munitions | Less Lethal munitions are designed specifically to avoid serious bodily injury or death when used properly. The devices are designed to produce irritation or discomfort to the individual to gain compliance to commands given by law enforcement personnel. |
| MACC | Multi-Agency Command Center |
| MOF | Museum of Flight |
| Nightstick | Also called a Short Stick, a wooden stick approx. 18-22 inches long used by police in situations where force is necessary to control a subject. |

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| OC | Oleoresin Capsicum, manufactured by Def Tec. Often called "Pepper Spray". Irritant formula of natural pepper combined with water, propylene glycol, and specially denatured alcohol. Food grade and FDA approved. OC acts as an irritant upon mucus membranes of the body, creating an uncomfortable burning feeling. Officers are issued a 4oz. hand-held personal OC dispenser. |
| OSHA | Occupational Safety and Health Agency |
| Patrol Vehicle | A police vehicle with visible police markings used to transport 1-4 officers. |
| Peacekeeper | A bullet resistant vehicle used by SWAT as a transportation and rescue vehicle. |
| Pepperball | A sixty eight caliber, .68, plastic ball fired from a civilian paint ball gun. The pepper ball contains one (1) gram of OC powder. Ball manufactured by JAYCOR, OC manufactured by Def Tec. |
| PIO | Public Information Officer |
| PSC | Public Safety Committee - organization of interjurisdictional agencies, with SPD as lead agency to plan the safety and security issues of the WTO Conference. |
| Riot Baton | Also called a Long Stick, a wooden stick approx. 40 inches long used by police in crowd management situations to keep people at a distance. |
| Safety Glasses | Plastic glasses to protect officers eyes from thrown or sprayed items, are not sealed around face and will not protect from some BIO HAZARD situations in the field. |
| SAT | Situational Assessment Team |
| SCCC | Seattle Central Community College |
| SFD | Seattle Fire Department |
| SHO | Seattle Host Organization - the nucleus of this organization was the Washington Council on International Trade (WCIT), the Boeing Company, and Microsoft. Organization established to coordinate and plan the WTO Conference. |
| SPD | Seattle Police Department |
| SPOC | Seattle Police Operations Center |
| SWAT | Special Weapons and Tactics |
| TOC | Tactical Operations Center |
| Tripods | Used to elevate a protester, making them difficult to arrest or move |
| USDS | United States Department of State |
| USSS | United States Secret Service |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| WNG | Washington National Guard |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

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
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Appendix A: Law Enforcement Continuum of Force Model



Appendix B: Prisoner Processing
(also known as the Arrest/Booking Teams and Field Prisoner Processing Teams)

The original plan for addressing the need for mass arrest included staffing from the Seattle Police Department, the King County Sheriff’s Office, and the King County Jail.

The Prisoner Processing subcommittee was required to identify a location for pre-booking prisoners arrested during the Conference. Jail facilities were not available because they were unable to accommodate mass pre-booking processing in addition to routine booking normally handled by the jails. Police facilities in the downtown core were also considered for pre-booking processing, but, were rejected due to the proximity to Conference venues and original arrest location.

In addition to the Seattle Police Department Arrest/Booking Teams and Prisoner Processing Teams, the King County Sheriff’s Office was listed as possibly being able to provide a 10 – 12 person arrest and processing team. The King County Jail was listed as able to provide transportation of prisoners for the Department on Monday and Tuesday.

The transportation plan included a bus supporting the incident staging areas at the processing/booking site and a bus from the processing/booking site to the appropriate Department of Adult Detention site.

The duties of the Seattle Police Field Prisoner Processing Teams included taking custody of prisoners brought to them by field officers. Procedures were established to allow for orderly transfer of custody from the arresting officer in the field to the processing facility at Sandpoint.

Original staffing for the Field Prisoner Processing Team was comprised of two sergeants and 16 officers. Before the Conference, staffing was cut to one sergeant and 8 officers. The team was equipped with four prisoner vans, one plain vehicle, one cell phone and four Polaroid cameras. On Wednesday, an additional 15 officers were assigned to the Team, however, only 4 officers arrived for assignment. Two sergeants and 16 officers were added to the Team on Thursday, working from 1230 to 2040 hours. An additional sergeant and 9 officers arrived to assist the Team at 2200 hours Thursday night. Staffing returned to the sergeant and eight officers for the remainder of the Conference.

The Teams became overwhelmed during periods of mass arrest due to the requirement of photographing the prisoner and gaining officer information on transfer of the prisoner. Once the suspects were placed on the bus, they were transported to the Sandpoint facility for processing.

The Sandpoint Prisoner Processing Team was staffed with a sergeant, 7 detectives, 3 ID technicians, 1 Evidence Unit warehouse, and two records Administrative Assistants from SPD. The King County Jail provided a nurse and health screener to assist in processing detainees. The Washington State Patrol placed a sergeant and 7 detectives on stand-by to assist with arrests from the freeway should they occur.

On Tuesday, Washington State Patrol added one sergeant and 7 detectives, thereby doubling their staffing at the facility.

Wednesday staffing was dramatically increased to accommodate the mass arrests made from the downtown core. The following resources were added to the facility:

1 sergeant, 3 officers and 23 recruits from the Seattle Police Academy, 1 sergeant and 6 officers from the North Precinct, 1 SPD captain, lieutenant, and legal advisor, one sergeant and 5 officers from the University of Washington, a captain, lieutenant, sergeant and 10 corrections officers from the King County Jail, 1 sergeant and 10 officers from Kirkland Police Department, 1 sergeant and 7 officers from Bainbridge Island Police Department.

The Sand Point Processing Team personnel were asked to process over 500 arrests on Wednesday. The field processing backlog was carried through to the facility as prisoners were pre-booked. The suspects were uncooperative as demonstrated by the following resulting in a severe impact to the efficiency of the processing plan:

- Prisoners refused to exit the buses.
- Prisoners inside the brig locked arms and refused to be separated.
- Prisoners refused to identify themselves or gave obviously false names.
- Too few police staff to handle the volume of arrests.

Further complicating matters was the lack of sufficient telephones, food and water for the prisoners and staff, inquiries from private attorneys and various media, and circulated reports of prisoners being mistreated. Each of these issues was addressed and by 2200 hours prisoner processing operations were running smoothly. On three occasions, protesters attorneys and representatives were allowed inside the Sand Point facility and provided with a briefing and escorted tours to allay their concerns regarding treatment of prisoners. The last of the prisoners arrested on Wednesday did not complete processing at Sand Point until 1030 hours on Thursday.

Appendix C: SPD Staffing Figures on November 29, 1999

| Assignment | Lieutenant | Sergeant | Officer | Total |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Westin Hotel | 1 | 6 | 40 | 47 |
| Sheraton Hotel | 1 | 5 | 37 | 43 |
| Cavanaugh Hotel | 1 | 5 | 32 | 38 |
| Olympic Four Season | 1 | 4 | 26 | 31 |
| Madison | 1 | 7 | 34 | 42 |
| Convention Center | 1 | 14 | 145 | 160 |
| Opening Ceremonies | 1 | 5 | 47 | 53 |
| Closing Ceremonies | 1 | 8 | 58 | 67 |
| Demonstration Management | 4 | 20 | 161 | 185 |
| Prisoner Processing | N/A | 2 | 14 | 16 |
| Chemical Agent Team | N/A | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| Paramount Theatre | 1 | 4 | 35 | 40 |
| Media Relations | N/A | N/A | 6 | 6 |
| EOC/MACC | 1 | 7 | 27 | 35 |
| Patrol-in the Precincts | 8 | 36 | 194 | 238 |
| Traffic Management | 2 | 6 | 42 | 50 |
| Parking Enforcement | | | 59 | 59 |
| SWAT Tactical | 2 | 4 | 27 | 33 |
| EOD-Bomb Squad | 1 | 2 | 7 | 10 |
| Arson | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Total | 27 | 138 | 999 | 1164 |

Appendix D: Mutual Aid Deployment Table

| Agency | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday |
|---|----------------|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Bainbridge Island | | | | |
| | 20 | | | |
| Bell Harbor Group (Auburn PD, Federal Way DPS, and Port of Seattle PD) | | | | |
| | 16 | | | |
| Bothell | | | | |
| | 9 | | 10 | 10 |
| DOC Emergency Response Team | | | | |
| | | 60 | 32 | 20 |
| DOC (Operations) | | | | |
| | 21 | | | |
| Edmonds (South Snohomish SWAT) | | | | |
| | 12 | | 12 Staged but not deployed | 12 |
| Back-filled to SPD | | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Enumclaw | | | | |
| | | 8 | | |
| Issaquah | | | | |
| | | 9 | | |
| Kirkland | | | | |
| | | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Mercer Island | | | | |
| | 7 | | | |
| Metro Pierce County SRT (Bonney Lake, Buckley, Gig Harbor, Milton, Orting, Steilacoom, and Sumner) | | | | |
| | 22 | 22 | 22 | |
| Pierce County | | | | |
| | | 58 | 58 Staged but not deployed | |
| Redmond | | | | |
| | | 25 | 26 Staged but not deployed | |
| Snohomish County ALERT (Bothell, Brier, Edmonds, Everett, Lake Stevens, Lynnwood, Marysville, Mill Creek, Monroe, Mountlake Terrace, Mukilteo, Snohomish CSO, Snohomish PD, and Sultan) | | | | |
| | 20 | 20 | 20 | |
| Tacoma | | | | |
| | 33 | | 48 Staged but not deployed | |
| UWPD | | | | |
| | 33 | 28 | 19 Staged but not deployed | 15 Staged but not deployed |
| Back-filled to SPD | 4 | 3 | | |
| King County SO | | | | |
| | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| Back-filled to SPD | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Washington State Patrol (Minus 51 non-sworn cadets) | | | | |
| | 324 | 324 | 324 | 324 |
| Total | 674 | 727 | 741 | 549 |

Appendix E: Chemical Irritants & Less Lethal Munitions

Chemical Irritants

Chemical irritants are used to disperse non-compliant crowds and rioters as well as dealing with individuals who are resistive, combative, or assaultive. The use of chemical irritants before closed hand or impact weapons techniques reduces the risk of injury to both officers and subjects.

The chemical irritants stocked prior to and used during the WTO Conference are the following:

“CS” (ortho-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) is an aerosolized particulate which is non- persistent in an open air application. Its effects are immediate, but remain for only 5-20 minutes after removal from the contaminated atmosphere. The Material Safety Data Sheet for the products purchased by the SPD is attached.

CS was tested extensively prior to its adoption as a primary riot control agent by the United States military. It has been utilized by most police agencies worldwide due to its high level of effectiveness and low risk factors.

CS is generally used in a wide area application to disperse crowds. There are a variety of delivery methods including hand thrown canisters and launched overhead projectiles.

“OC” (oleoresin capsicum) is a food grade derivative of chili peppers. It is suspended in either a water-based or oil-based solution and utilizes an inert propellant. Its effects are immediate and persist for approximately 45 minutes. OC has also received extensive testing, and is an “industry standard” alternative to greater levels of force. OC has been in widespread use in the United States since 1992 by police agencies.

OC is generally used in spot applications on individuals with a three or four ounce spray dispenser or small groups by means of larger spray dispensers. The Material Safety Data Sheet for the products purchased by the SPD is attached.

| | |
|-------|--|
| MK4 | Small hand held personal Oleoresin Capsicum, OC, dispenser containing 4 oz. of Chemical Irritants. Officers often carry it on the duty leather gear or in a small pocket. Often called Pepper Spray. |
| MK9 | Hand held OC dispenser containing 9oz. of Chemical Irritants. This canister has a pistol grip with a thumb dispensing switch. Often called Pepper Spray. |
| MK46 | Fire extinguisher size dispenser of Chemical Irritants. Either vertically or horizontally dispensed. Manufactured by Def Tec Corp. Often called Pepper Spray. |
| T160C | A long thin expulsion grenade. This canister has two emissions ports on the side and a foam bumper on the base. This is a non-pyrotechnic device as the OC is expelled by the release of gas from a CO2 cartridge inside the |

| | |
|-------|--|
| | canister. |
| #2CS | A hand thrown continuous discharge grenade. The canister remains a single unit as it dispenses the CS. |
| #3CS | A hand thrown continuous discharge grenade. This canister is slightly smaller than the No. 2 CS canister. The No. 3 canister remains a single unit as it dispenses the CS. |
| #4CS | A hand thrown continuous discharge grenade. The canister is deployed as a single unit then it breaks into three smaller canisters as it dispenses the CS. |
| #5CS | Similar to a #3CS |
| #98CS | A small hand thrown continuous discharge grenade. The canister remains as a single unit as it dispenses the CS. |
| #98S | Similar to the #98CS, but contains smoke only. |
| #17CS | A multi-shot pyrotechnic CS round. Capable of delivering 4 canisters of CS to a distance of 75 to 150 yards. This round can be fired from a single shot 37mm launchers, and SAGE S-* delivery systems. |
| #19CS | A multi-shot pyrotechnic CS round. Capable of delivering 5 canisters of CS. This round can be fired from a single shot 37mm launchers, and SAGE S-* delivery systems. |
| #21CS | This round instantaneously pushes the CS powder out of the end of the delivery system. This round is designed for crowd management, crowd control situations, and at close ranges. |
| #F509 | Hand thrown CS round. Similar to #2CS and #3CS. |

Less lethal Munitions

Less lethal munitions are designed specifically to avoid serious bodily injury or death when used properly. The devices are designed to produce irritation or discomfort to the individual gaining compliance to commands given by law enforcement personnel.

| | |
|--------------|--|
| #15RP | This is a rubber ball body containing additional small rubber balls. When deployed, the ball breaks into two halves and disperses the balls in a circular pattern. |
| #15OC | This is a rubber ball body containing additional small rubber balls. When deployed, the ball breaks into two halves and disperses the balls in a circular patterns. Additionally the ball contains .56 grams of OC powder that is dispensed when the ball is deployed. |
| #15CS | This is a rubber ball body containing additional small rubber balls. When deployed, the ball breaks into two halves and disperses the balls in a circular patterns. Additionally the ball contains 9.9 grams of CS powder that is dispensed when the ball is deployed. |
| #27RP, #28RP | Similar to #15RP, with .32 and .60 cal. sized balls. |
| #20W | This 37mm less lethal round fires five wood batons and is designed to be direct fired or skip fired in a crowd control or crowd management situation. |
| #20F | This 37mm less lethal round fires five foam batons and is designed to be direct fired or skip fired in a crowd control or crowd management situation. |
| #37BR, #40BR | This 37mm less lethal round fires a nylon web bag containing silica sand (bean bag round) and is designed to be direct fired in a crowd control or crowd management situation. |
| #40 Exact | This less lethal round fires a single hard plastic baton round and is designed to be direct fired in a crowd control or crowd management situation. |

WTO Muniton Supplies

| Riot Agents | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Specific Munitions | Pre-WTO Inventory | Emergency Purchased | Acquired Mutual Aid | Post WTO Inventory | Number Used |
| #98CS | 92 | 746 | 105 | 943 | 71 |
| #98CS | 32 | 0 | | 32 | 27 |
| #2CS | 0 | 804 | 10 | 814 | 9 |
| #3CS | 19 | 6 | 24 | 49 | 15 |
| #4CS | 36 | 302 | 53 | 391 | 211 |
| #5CS | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| #517CS | 10 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 4 |
| T16CS | 11 | 0 | 10 | 21 | * |
| T16OC | 5 | 0 | 15 | 20 | * |
| #15RP | 60 | 440 | 20 | 520 | 237 |
| #15OC | 0 | 120 | 25 | 145 | 25 |
| #15CS | 1 | 340 | 0 | 341 | 172 |
| F509 | 0 | 184 | 0 | 184 | 59 |
| #19CS | 0 | 300 | 48 | 348 | * |
| #17CS | 42 | 0 | 69 | 111 | 100 |
| #21CS | 2 | 0 | 15 | 17 | 5 |
| Impact Munitions | | | | | |
| #21OC | 5 | 0 | 25 | 30 | 8 |
| #20F | 0 | 0 | 41 | 41 | * |
| #20W | 80 | 400 | 269 | 749 | 230 |
| 37/40 BR | 79 | 200 | 647 | 926 | 361 |
| #40 Exact | 20 | 150 | 0 | 170 | 64 |
| #28A | 0 | 0 | 40 | 40 | 32 |
| #28B | 15 | 158 | 132 | 305 | 6 |
| #27A | 23 | 100 | 10 | 133 | 127 |
| #27B | 6 | 0 | 99 | 105 | 89 |
| OC Spray | | | | | |
| MK4 | 0 | 570 | 0 | 570 | 31 |
| MK9 | 0 | 400 | 38 | 438 | 111 |
| MK46V | 7 | 100 | 0 | 107 | 0 |
| MK46 refill | 26 | 155 | 0 | 181 | 18 |

** Final inventory indicates more munitions than itemized in the column marked "total available." This leads to the conclusion that none, or a very small number of these munitions were used, and the source of the additional munitions has not been fully identified (though almost certainly acquired via mutual aid.)*

Appendix F: Chemical Resupply Plan

A plan for resupply was established by the SWAT commander and included a rapid shipment by air, of preordered stock from Defensive Technology in Casper, Wyoming. Additionally, the SWAT commander created a list of available mutual aid agency munitions and contact phone numbers should the need for re-supply occur.

During crowd management operations, some supervisors and officers reported over the radio that they were "out of gas" at points of time after the initial application of chemical irritants. CART Teams, some of which had been split up during deployment, quickly began depleting chemical irritants and ran out of preferred munitions, which had been particularly successful. CART's conserved their remaining munitions until they could be resupplied by the SWAT Team.

Officers were authorized to use individually issued OC spray. When their individual canisters were expended, they could not count on re-supply as there was never a plan to restock the individual officer canisters.

The Mk-46 canisters were, according to the plan, to be refilled by trained officers and returned to the field. However, the exchange of empty canisters from the field and the return of filled canisters never worked according to expectations. Canisters were either not retained once expended or unavailable for refill as re-supply teams were available.

The SPOC approved an emergency purchase of OC from local vendors. Efforts to procure and distribute chemical irritants were initiated by several resourceful officers. Some officers were able to navigate through the crowd on foot to reach officers who were in need of re-supply. The Department of Corrections and other allied agencies made their chemical munitions available to field commanders to assist in the re-supply efforts.

The initial inventory of munitions was:

- \$5,000 to 7,000, this included existing inventory, plus a purchase of \$8,100 of new munitions for a total of approximately \$15,000 of munitions.
- The SWAT request for purchase of munitions following Tuesday's first dispersal was: \$16,430.
- The additional EOC request for purchase of munitions following Tuesday's first dispersal was: \$ 125,102.

Appendix G: Kalberer Building Incident

Sunday, November 28th

At approximately 2220 hours, SPD Communications received a flyer from local media reporting a takeover of the Kalberer building at 914 Virginia. A patrol supervisor responded and saw 35-40 people outside the building, 5-6 people on the top floor, and spotters on the roof. The supervisor verified the building was being illegally occupied after talking with a spokesperson for the occupants on the street.

The supervisor observed the following:

- That the first group inside numbered 10-15 suspects although the group wouldn't confirm the number.
- The occupation was coordinated. They arrived in small groups, many suspects were similarly dressed, had radio communications, and were overheard asking for construction materials and tools.

- Officers heard hammering inside, and believed doors were being secured from inside.

When the call was dispatched, SPD and WSP night SWAT responded to the scene and were advised to stand down by SPOC. The patrol supervisor took action to contain the building with officers and to prevent new arrivals from entering or delivering materials inside but allow suspects to exit. The supervisor initiated discussions with the group in an attempt to enter the building and make an inspection. He did permit food and water to be delivered in an attempt to negotiate with the suspects.

SPOC Command identified the following issues:

- There was no legal standing to remove protesters as the building owner was not immediately known.
- The greatest risk was from a fire hazard.
- Protestors would likely be gone by Wednesday
- Officers overheard suspects talking about barricading efforts and suspects were concerned about police storming the building.
- A police entry into the building even with a legal basis would be difficult due to staffing. It would be better to conduct an entry in the daytime, particularly on Tuesday during the march when most of the protesters would be out of the building.

SPOC & EOC discussed the situation and determined the following course of action:

- Have SFD, Health Dept. and SPD negotiate with suspects to allow regular inspections to ensure that the building presented no imminent fire or health hazard.
- West Precinct would remain on scene and monitor the activities.
- An effort to negotiate with the suspects would be undertaken by the Night Venue Commander.

In the early morning (0130 hours), utilities were turned off at the building after requests to inspect were denied.

Monday, November 29th

0800 An oncoming watch commander took command of the scene and was contacted by a spokesperson. While she disavowed having control over the group she would deliver messages. At this time the building owner had not been verified.

1000 The building owner was verified and confirmed that the occupants were trespassing.

1200 The owner arrived and began negotiating with the occupants for rent. At this time it was believed there were 50-70 people inside. Rent negotiations were unsuccessful and the owner considered the occupants trespassers.

1620 The watch commander advised the spokesperson the occupants were subject to immediate arrest. The spokesperson entered the building and moments later the suspects, estimated at 100, began exiting the building but they remained in front of the entryway.

1645 Another watch commander arrived on the scene. The spokesperson informed one of the watch commanders the building was now empty. As this was occurring, 100-200 people began arriving on the scene. The original on-scene watch commander with 15-20 officers and two sergeants were going to take control of the perimeter. As tactics were discussed, the window of opportunity to take control was lost. The tactical discussions included the uncertainty about whether the building was really empty, the availability of officers to hold their position, the proximity to the West Precinct and potential for another protest there, and in progress WTO events. The suspects outside the building re-entered and continued with their illegal occupation.

Following the re-entry, SPD continued to monitor the building throughout the week. According to SPD observers, it was difficult to identify suspects entering and leaving because they would arrive and depart in groups and then disperse in different directions.

Thursday, December 2nd

The property owner threatened to take action if SPD didn't intercede.

SPOC assigned a new commander to the Kalberer. Principles involved were the property owners, a Mayor's representative, and a Low Income Housing Institute representative (LIHI).

Prior to meeting with the principals, SPOC advised the following:

- There were intelligence reports that anarchists were using the Kalberer as a base of operations.
- The FBI wanted to charge the anarchists federally.
- SWAT was being sent to develop an entry plan.

SPD Intelligence was consulted to verify the occupation by anarchists; they responded by saying there was no evidence to believe that the anarchists were inside at the time. SPD Intelligence was consulted. They advised that suspected anarchists had been in and out of the Kaberer building throughout the week. SPD Intelligence was not, however, in a position to identify the current occupants as anarchists or simply as protesters.

The commander continued to talk with the principals, discuss strategies to resolve the situation, and to develop plans for an entry. Prior to implementing the plan on Saturday, the LIHI representative advised she found alternative shelter and most of the suspects left. All but a few of the hard core suspects remained inside. At approximately 1200 hours the LIHI representative advised all of the suspects left the building.

Appendix H: State of Emergency Boundary Maps

November 30th – December 3rd

The following sequence of computer generated maps were produced in the SPOC to track the boundaries established pursuant to the declaration of civil emergency, commencing on November 30th and Concluding on December 3rd.

*These maps are not available for download.
The maps are included in the printed version of the WTO After Action Report,
which are available at all the Seattle Public Libraries.*

Appendix I: WTO Expenditures

Appendix I: WTO Expenditures

| | Preliminary Jun-99 | Final SPD Proposed Jul-99 | Approved Aug-99 | Actual Cost Dec-99 |
|-----------|--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Labor | \$5,559,365 | \$5,559,365 | \$4,666,551 | \$5,768,051 |
| Equipment | \$1,534,586 | \$893,531 | \$598,156 | \$1,104,800 |
| Total | \$7,093,951 | \$6,452,896 | \$5,264,707 | \$6,872,851 |

*Costs for other agencies are not included.
Costs for SPD reflect use of 1999 Adopted Budget resources as well as new funding.*

Detailed WTO Equipment List Budget information is available in the printed report of the WTO After Action Report which is available at all Seattle Public Libraries.

Appendix J: Explanation of Incident Command System

*The ICS Directive is not available for download.
The ICS Directive is included in the printed version of the WTO After Action Report, which are available at all the Seattle Public Libraries.*