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Twins say $4 million interest rate hit didn't cost team bullpen help

Covering the local media's financial troubles, I've come to appreciate the joys of a Standard & Poor's ratings report. As a Twins fan, I'm interested in how the new ballpark is doing. Yesterday, the twain met.

As Bloomberg News' Aaron Kuriloff first noted, the Twins were forced to pump $4 million into their Twins Ballpark LLC following last fall's global economic meltdown, when short-term interest rates spiked wildly.

That's a big cash suck considering a total of $60 million in bonds due in 12 and 14 years hence. Barring another catastrophe, the $4 million gets the Twins to Opening Day, when ballpark revenue will begin paying off the debt.

I know what you're thinking: So that's why we didn't sign that late-inning reliever this winter!

Not true, insists Twins President Dave St. Peter. The players are paid from a separate entity, Twins LLC. While you're forgiven for thinking it all comes from the same Pohlad wallet, St. Peter insists Twins Ballpark LLC funds are not sucked from Twins LLC.

Still, amid new-stadium bubbliness, it's interesting to read an expert outsider's take on how well the Twins can pay their bills.

Overall, I'd characterize as the conclusions as cautiously positive. Here are some highlights, with St. Peter's responses where necessary:

The stadium's bond rating remained unchanged at BBB-minus
There are a couple of ways to frame this. BBB-minus is one step above junk bond status. On the other hand, that's still investment grade, which is more than many other corporations (including media companies) can say amid the meltdown. It's also an accomplishment that the rating remained stable.

The stadium benefits from the Twins established fan base, repayment guarantees and relatively low leverage
Right now, 10-year projections show 2.5 times the amount needed to service the debt, or two times what's needed with designated ticket revenues removed.

That said, the report cites several potential weaknesses:

Since 2002, the team's attendance has grown 2.8 percent, twice the historical average
Why is that a weakness? Because it likely won't continue forever. S&P analyst Jodi Hecht notes the Twins have won the Central Division four times in that span — and such success is unlikely to continue long-term. (Has she been watching this year?)

St. Peter scoffs at the notion the attendance gains won't persist for at least the next several years, given the shiny new ballpark.

Twins attendance has ranged from 2.2 million to 2.5 million between 2002 and 2008. St. Peter acknowledges the Twins are projecting attendance "far north" of two million in the new stadium, which has an annual capacity of about 3.2 million fans (40,000 per game).

You can decide whether you'd go the cautious fiscal analyst route or side with the optimistic team exec.

The team's assumption about local stadium competition is "aggressive"
In other words, the club may be overly optimistic about grabbing dollars as new facilities like the Gopher football stadium and perhaps a Vikes stadium come online. The analysis notes Twins "pricing levels are significantly higher than the current stadium," and may be hard to maintain.

St. Peter challenges this, noting average Target Field prices appear higher because there won't be 15,000 ultra-cheap upper deck outfield seats in the new park. With the exception of some high-priced seats by the field, he says, post-Dome hikes are under 10 percent.

"I'm not aware of any team with a lesser jump" when moving to a new ballpark, St. Peter states. "Most of the time, it's double, triple or quadruple what we're doing."

Having praised Target Field's cheap seats (and witnessed people paying steadily higher Dome prices in recent years), I'd guess the analyst is being cautious given the failure of new New York parks to sell their premium seats.

However, the Twins prices are a tenth of Yankee stadium's. I wouldn't be surprised if they're a tougher sell than the locals thought two years ago, but there won't be a Big Apple-type embarrassment.

Stadium contingency funds are 'adequate to low'
The report praises the team's "maximum price contract" with builder Mortenson Co., but a low reserve might seem scary given the $4 million hit.

Still, the analysis quickly adds that the contingency level is "in line with other stadium and large scale projects."

St. Peter argues, fairly convincingly, that the best evidence backup cash isn't a problem is that the company has put so much into optional improvements: $55 million to be precise, even though the report only credits them with $17 million.

"We wouldn't add those incremental dollars without a high degree of confidence" in ownership's financial strength, he says.

The team's creditworthiness is 'lower than that of the stadium'
That's somewhat ominous because, if you recall, the stadium bonds are rated one level above junk. S&P doesn't have rating on the team, so the danger is difficult to precisely judge.

Still, the document praises management for "implementing practices to improve profitability," adding that team revenues are limited by the local market's size and capacity. Again, St. Peter refers to the lack of penny pinching as proof things are not teetering. Hopefully, the Pohlads' contributions aren't overleveraged!

The team still faces an interest rate risk
All told, 60 percent of this stadium debt is variable interest "swapped to fixed-rate with an imperfect hedge that retains exposure to the change in the spread between LIBOR and SIFMA interest rates."

In other words, if seven-day to one-year interest rates spike, the club will still feel pain. While noting the Twins have suite and club-seat deposits that can cushion a cash crunch until Opening Day, the report states "Overall, interest costs will be higher" than the original pro forma projection.

Tougher sells ahead
Finally, the report notes the team has sold 80 percent of the premium seating and 50 percent of corporate sponsorships — the latter a surprisingly low figure, at least to me.

Many of these deals expire in four to ten years, creating repayment risk down the road, especially if the team is not as attractive when the new-stadium smell wears off. (See: Timberwolves.) Still, such deal lengths are typical in many stadia.

The report also states "sales of remaining inventory will be more difficult to complete than those currently signed."

"Tell me something I don't know," says St. Peter with a chuckle, knowing what every salesman does: the last sales are the toughest. "I'm trying to figure out what the news is there."

Comments (3)

David, I think you're missing a few things here. Typically, teams put in money when ballpark construction begins and at the end of the process. Putting in more up front, I am guessing, also has to do with design changes specified by the Twins that come outside the design specs. That's very common: a team will say they want space finished at a higher grade, they want higher-grade A/V equipment/scoreboard or they want the addition of, oh, rooftop seats not found in the original bid design. Again, very common.

Also, it is typical to put the ballpark entity separately from the actual team. Do you know how many legal entities encompass the Twins? There's Twins LLC. There's Twins Ballpark LLC. There's MTI Partnership. There's CRP Sports. There's PRC, Inc.

I guess I'm with St. Peter: I fail to see the story here. Considering the bonds floated by the Mets and Yankees for their new ballparks were rated at junk-bond status (as are many sport-facilities bonds), I'd argue the real story is that the ballpark bonds were rated as investment grade. (Word is that Miami-Dade County is having some issues floating bonds for the new Marlins ballpark at anything higher than junk-bond status.) That's pretty amazing in this economy. S&P's business is to point out all the potential problems as warnings to bond buyers, but that doesn't mean each problem is likely to happen.

Kevin -

I don't think I painted the separate entity(s) as unique; it was just St. Peter's way of explaining the bullpen factor.

Unless I mis-gleaned St. Peter, the $4 million toward the bonds was an unanticipated cost, while the $55 million in ballpark improvements were a discretionary cost.

There's a difference but the fact that the Twins were able to do so much of the latter indicates they are probably fine on the former.

As for the rest, I think fans (at least the money geeks) would be interested in knowing the financial status/evaluation of the project. I'm not trying to say the thing is failing - in some sense, this is more explainer than "gotcha" news story.

As noted in the piece, BBB-minus - and holding - is pretty damn good these days. That alone is newsworthy, if you frame it as economic man bites dog.

I think the article came off a little more negative than you anticipated or intended. Plus, you kinda buried your lede if the point was to show the Twins ballpark bonds are at investment grade. ;)

There are always unanticipated costs with any large construction project; a swing of +/-5 percent is virtually guaranteed, and a +/-10 percent swing is not uncommon. It's not a surprise at all that it cost the Twins more to borrow money at a time when the world financial institutions came crashing to a halt.