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After Garnett, who should the Wolves pair with Karl-Anthony Towns?

Karl-Anthony Towns
MinnPost photo by Craig Lassig
Karl-Anthony Towns is both a revelation and a boy among men, hindered by the physically immaturity of his 20-year old body when coping with the rigors of the NBA scrum under the basket.

When it comes to credentials, the players who collectively comprise the frontcourt of the Minnesota Timberwolves — the team’s centers and power forwards — are an august contingent.

There is the certain Hall of Famer who revolutionized the defensive mobility of power forwards and has grabbed more defensive rebounds than anyone in NBA history. There is the silken prodigy and top pick in the 2015 NBA draft, already the best all-around player on the team after 44 games of experience.

Four others include the reigning Euroleague MVP; the behemoth who commanded a 5-year, $60-million salary for his brute strength and balletic moves; the player whose willingness and ability to learn makes coach Sam Mitchell “ecstatic”; and the four-year collegian for whom the Wolves were willing to deal a future first-round draft pick.

The reality, however, is less impressive. The synergy of skills that cohere and elevate a team are a fleeting commodity among these six members of the Wolves frontcourt. The reasons for this — especially compared to the aforementioned high points on their respective resumes — are stubby and intractable.

Age has sapped the endurance and shriveled the physical skills of Kevin Garnett to the point where it is all he can do to swallow 26 percent of the team’s minutes out on the court. Karl-Anthony Towns is both a revelation and a boy among men, hindered by the physically immaturity of his 20-year old body when coping with the rigors of the NBA scrum under the basket.

Nemanja Bjelica is flummoxed by the frequency of games and the changes in philosophy, physicality and culture that accompany a switch from Europe to the NBA. Nikola Pekovic has the face of a Bond villain, a torso of pliable granite, pistons for thighs, and lower extremities as fragile as glass, the proverbial feet of clay on his mythical physique.

Gorgui Dieng absorbs advice like a sponge and faithfully endeavors to wring optimal production out on the court, but the ceiling on his skill set is more consonant with rental property than penthouse architecture. And Adreian Payne performs with a haughty inconsistency borne of overestimated self-regard and an alternately delayed or skewed sense of anticipation.

It adds up to a frontcourt that is less than the sum of its frequently compelling pieces.

The temporary blueprint

The challenge for Mitchell and the Wolves braintrust is figuring out how to build something sustainable from a unit that by individual turns is currently too old, too young, too green to the NBA, too injury-prone, too limited and too incompetent.

Mitchell deserves credit for understanding that far and away the top frontcourt priority is the development of Towns, and that the best way to meaningfully accelerate that development is to play Towns alongside Garnett as much as possible. Ninety-three percent of KG’s court time — 508 out of 546 minutes — has been performed in tandem with Towns, with many of the remaining 38 minutes caused by Towns being sidelined due to foul trouble.

Towns and KG is where the best kind of synergy occurs. The precocious tyro executes the favorable situations engineered by the wizened sage, while the sprightly, multi-talented phenom enables the faded superstar to circumscribe his skills down to his core virtues. It’s torch-passing at an exalted level, a goosebump-inducing transaction of profound simplicity.

Per basketball-reference.com, KG and Towns produce a net rating of plus 4.9 points per 100 possessions over their opponents when they are on the court together. Among the 20 most frequently deployed two-player combos, that is the second highest rating, behind only KG and point guard Ricky Rubio, who have delivered plus 6.3 points per 100 possessions in their 454 minutes on the court together.

The value of KG’s complementary excellence, especially on defense, is reflected in the fact that Towns posts a negative net rating in every other frontcourt pairing. In order of frequency, he is -4.1 points in 252 minutes with Dieng, minus 1.3 points in 241 minutes with Bjelica, -15.1 points in 99 minutes with Payne and -21.5 points in 36 minutes with Pekovic.

The abiding dilemma is that the productive KG-Towns pairing is temporary, and already limited. Even with maximum current usage of the duo, it accounts for only 508 of Towns’ 1,289 minutes on the court, a percentage certain to shrink and then disappear, if not next season the year afterward.

In other words, Mitchell and company have made the most positive first step possible in the situational development of Towns by teaming him with KG as much as possible. By how does the franchise pivot into step two to derive the best possible short-term and long-term value from their quickening superstar? What frontcourt duo on the current roster makes the most sense?

The case for Bjelica

Purely by the net-rating numbers, the 27-year old Euro Nemanja Bjelica is the best frontcourt fit for Towns after KG.

The most obvious impediment to this pairing is their collective lack of both bulk and experience on the defensive end. The book on both players is to bang them off their rhythm, bully them out of position, and engage their bodies and their psyches in the crafty physical warfare that is in the grey area between dirty and kosher by NBA standards.

One of the many ways KG is a tonic for Towns is as an enforcer against such behavior. If relatively trivial cheap shots for stealth annoyance is the strategy on the table, Garnett is a five-star general of planning and execution.

But even KG can’t overcome the seemingly inherent bias of referees against rookies, and in that sense both Towns and Bjelly are unquestionably rookies. Towns currently ranks fourth in the NBA with 137 personal fouls and Bjelica fouls at an even greater frequency — 5.2 per 36 minutes.

Of course, due to their unfamiliarity with NBA jousting and their relative absence of mature sinew, Towns and Bjelly draw plenty more whistles than just the borderline calls the refs ignore on veterans. And in my long interview with Mitchell earlier this month, he accepts that reality as part of the process, preferring that Towns in particular begin battling his opponent above the free throw line to deny him position down low.

The good news is even with his competitive disadvantages in muscle maturity and game experience, Towns is handling life in the NBA trenches with remarkable aplomb and facility. The eye test shows him being thrashed by hulking big men from Denver, OKC, the Clippers and Cleveland. But according to the defensive tracking data at nba.com, Towns has been very effective at that end of the court.

Specifically, players guarded by Towns are shooting 45.1 percent, lower than the 47 percent a typical defender would allow against the same array of field goal attempts. The rookie’s effectiveness is especially pronounced at the most vital point of attack for a big man — near the rim. Opponents are shooting 52.5 percent on shots within six feet of the hoop, a whopping 7.4 percent less than the 59.9 percent allowed by a typical defender.

Towns’ field goal percentage allowed remains 5.3 percent lower than the norm on shots from zero to 10 feet away from the hoop, and one percent better than average on shots from 15 feet out. It is only on three-pointers where Towns is producing inferior results relative to typical shooting percentages. Opponents are making 41.1 percent of their treys when guarded by Towns, compared to the average of 33.6 percent. But three-pointers comprise only 10.1 percent of the shots Towns personally defends.

Even the multitude of fouls Towns commits is as much embedded in the Wolves defense as his own peccadillos. Indeed, of the six frontcourt players on the roster, Towns fouls the least frequently per minute played, garnering 3.8 whistles every 36 minutes. By comparison, Pekovic is at 6.1 per 36 minutes, followed by Payne (5.8), Bjelica (5.2), Garnett (4.5) and Dieng (3.9).

Perhaps the greater problem — or least the place where Garnett is most helpful on defense — is in the blizzard of screens and switches and confounding flow that requires rapid-fire decision-making and communication to decipher and respond accordingly.

In that area, Dieng would be a better complement to Towns, as the most KG-like member of the frontcourt in parsing and defending pick and rolls and other schemes.

But in most other aspects of the game, Dieng offers a paler version of Towns’ versatility, creating as much redundancy as synergy between them. As hard and as admirably as he works, the hard truth on Dieng is that he is less a combo center-forward than a ‘tweener, caught in the gap of those two positions. His ability to perform capably in certain matchups at both center and power forward is valuable in a backup capacity, but less advantageous in tandem with Towns, who is a superior “swiss army knife” in the frontcourt.

By contrast, Bjelica is a power forward, specifically a “stretch four” who creates space on offense with his long-range shooting, closer to a small forward than a center in the overall package he presents. Having already performed at a high enough to earn the MVP award in the very competitive Euroleague last season, the 27-year old rookie has a better chance than Dieng or Payne at becoming a viable starter on a championship contender.

Yes, as recently as my last column, I ripped Bjelica for being unselfish to a fault on his shot selection. But like his proclivity for fouling and his maddening knack for traveling (which has been curbed recently), I trust his resilience toward improvement, especially since his belated emergence from the wretched play that lasted for a month following a minor knee injury.

Bjelica spaces the floor and moves the ball, two things that benefit KAT on offense. Granted, it is not a particularly large sample size — Towns has played 252 minutes with Bjelly and 1,037 without him — but Towns’ shooting percentage is significantly higher at the rim (74.4 versus 66.0), from 10-16 feet (54.5 versus 39.5) and from 16 feet out to the three-point line (52.4 versus 45.8) with Bjelly in the frontcourt. The lone decline, from 3-10 feet out, is minor (42.9 versus 45.0).

It is significant that Towns also hasn’t attempted a single three-pointer with Bjelly on the court, which robs the Wolves of a marksman who has nailed 38.9 percent of his shots from deep. Then again, with Towns around to magnetize defenders down in the paint, Bjelly shoots 45.5 percent from behind the arc, compared to 34.8 percent when the rookies are not in tandem.

Playing with Bjelica turns Towns into more of a paint performer. Anyone who saw him turn quality defenders like Anthony Davis and Zaza Pachulia into knots with his incredible footwork the past two games can’t really argue with that. Sure, you can put Towns with Pek and let him roam around at power forward. But he also shoots just 1-for-6 at the rim in his 36 minutes with Pekovic, and 6-for-11 beyond it.

By now everybody realizes that Pek’s next game is never guaranteed. His chronic injury history makes any future contributions a bonus for smart basketball architects. Nor is Payne’s NBA future exceptionally bright.

What cinches the argument for Bjelica is his demonstrated capacity to perform well with the current core of the ball club. Bjelica, Rubio and Towns are a gaudy plus 13.7 points per 100 possessions in 150 minutes together. Add Andrew Wiggins to that trio and you get plus 11.8 point per 100 possessions for in 144 minutes of a four-player combination.

Toss in Tayshaun Prince and that five-player group is plus 19.8 in 61 minutes.

Small ball woes

As a closing aside, it should be acknowledged that the modern NBA game increasingly must account for “small ball” lineups that don’t feature two classical frontcourt performers. The other night in Dallas, the Mavs improvised around the absence of their future Hall of Fame power forward Dirk Nowitzki by going small, especially in crunchtime, to great effect.

Specifically, Dallas coach Rick Carlisle deployed his swingman Chandler Parson in the “power forward” role, a strategy that the current Wolves roster, for all its glut of swingmen, couldn’t effectively counter. Mitchell went with Tayshaun Prince, the most logical choice, but Parsons’ constant movement had the aging Prince playing “red rover” against myriad Maverick picks, hastening a fatigue that accelerated to catastrophic proportion in overtime. Along with the Wolves missing open looks at the other end, it was the key factor in a disheartening defeat.

Put bluntly, it is time for Shabazz Muhammad to step up and demonstrate that he can defend “small fours” in these pint-sized lineups. If he can’t, the Wolves need to go find a rugged, “3-and-D” swingman who will.

Meanwhile, KG is helping groom Towns for greatness. And Wolves fans are waiting for Nemanja Bjelica to step up and fill at least part of the gaping void that occurs when Garnett rests this season, and retires in 2017 or ’18. 

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Comments (15)

Good points

In the long run, a bulked up KAT at center, lined up with Rubio and Wiggins in a classic 1-3-5 team core. Until then, this team is developmental.
One immediate short term solution would be to trade Martin (maybe packaged with Muhammad) for a real power forward.
In the long run, the two questions are whether Rubio ever learns how to shoot, and whether Bjelica adapts to the NBA game. If these happen, then the Woofies are a winner in three years. If not; another rebuilding job.

decent take

Paul--

I agree that the building blocks of Towns and Wiggins are relatively secure and that at the least Rubio is deserving of third billing. Not sure that Wiggins won't reach superstardom more rapidly and with more elevation as a shooting guard instead of a small forward however.
I think a "real power forward" would take more than Martin and Bazzy unless our scouts are smarter and find someone undervalued. A while back I pitched Martin and Payne for Markieff Morris after Morris had become a huge headache and tossed a towel at his head coach. But the moment for getting Morris cheap seems to have passed, if it ever existed at all.
Would heartily agree that Rubio becoming more accurate and Bjelica discovering the confidence and flow of his Euro prime would go a long way toward contention for the playoffs and perhaps further in the postseason. Disagree that if it doesn't happen team faces "another rebuilding job." As I wrote in the first column after games were played this season, with Towns and Wiggins on the roster, the hardest part of the rebuild is already accomplished.

Britt on Ricky

If a player is going to improve his shooting he does it in his 1st few years in the league. Rubio is what he is as a shooter, I am more concerned with unforced turnovers and some poor decisions he's making with the ball. He is not close to be a third option on a championship team. I remember reading the new "shooting coach" was going to fix Ricky a while back, didn't happen. I like him as an entertainer way more than a winning basketball player.

At this point in the season I would like to see the Wolves play some small ball with Bazzy. He is a poor defender on speed guys but he is strong, let him bang and fight bigger guys. Towns, Bazzy, Zach, Wiggins and Rubio switch everything, front the post and pressure the ball. Couldn't be any worse and it might be fun to watch.

Years 2 and 3 offer space to experiment

It's good for a rookie to experience as much stability as they can, but they should be willing to try combinations and figure out how to make them work. Really, the only constant companion in all of this is Wiggins. Surrounding them should be flexibility, both in skills and defensive ability. They don't need 5 clear starters for the future as much as they need 7-8 players offering them quality options in as many facets of the game as possible. Once it's clear a guy will be good and doesn't need a niche, they should really diversify as much as possible if they want to ever compete with the great teams. His ballhandling and footwork leave open some intriguing possibilities.

Dieng is an intriguing piece *if* he figures out how to play faster. His perimeter defense is really underrated; there aren't a lot of guys his size who get as many steals as he does. Offensively, he's the only guy on the team who makes long 2s at an acceptable rate and could become a corner 3 option as well. I'm still trying to figure out if he plays so slowly because he's cautious or doesn't process the game quickly.

I'll be concerned about Bjelica if he's like this next season. It's often forgotten that they were days away from giving away Pek in his second season before Darko got hurt and he and Rubio started tapping into their chemistry on pick and rolls; Pek was unremarkable in his rookie season except for fouling and 3-second violations. Bjelly's in a tough spot in that a lot of teams would want him to chuck away when open but that's probably not a good idea with a group already prone to chucking. I get that Philly and Houston let weak shooters fire away, but I see that as more "gaming the system."

clock ticking

PSR--

I hear you, and agree for the most part. But can't help being concerned about Wiggins contract being halfway through after this season. Have you seen how his personality changes when he crosses the border into Canada? So much more relaxed and happy.
In other words, the Wolves need to generate genuine momentum in the next year or two to not only develop subsidiary players and blossom their stars, but more to keep their stars engaged and endorsed in the future of the franchise. That might be harder than it looks as I check out comparable teams in the West like Denver, New Orleans, Utah and even Sacramento, who would be the 8th seed if the season ended right now. Bottom line, it is a rugged road (two cliches in one sentence!).
Thus, while I agree that Towns is glorious because he has multiple niches, I also think continuity is going to be important going forward. One of the reasons I prefer Bjelica to Dieng is not only the position firmness, but also because I think, despite his current confusion/adjustment, Bjelly just has a better idea about how to play the game than Dieng, more so on the offensive end right now but I believe eventually on defense too.
You like Dieng a little better than I do, which is odd because I acknowledge Dieng was probably the best Timberwolf in the first half of last season (low bar there) and has improved this season. But as I said in the piece, I think his "versatility" is more about how he doesn't fit into any position rather than how he fits into multiple positions--kind of like LaVine.
The slowness of Dieng is most upsetting when he corrals an offensive rebound or otherwise finds himself with the ball beneath the hoop in a scrum. It is like he gathers his thoughts instead of immediately going up or kicking it out. I guess getting your shot blocked down there often enough makes you gunshy on the shot, but at least make the pass to reset the offense.
Count me among those who want Bjelly to chuck. I think both he and LaVine remain the best three-point threats on the team. I find it ironic that Bazzy and Rubio has established themselves as greater threats simply through a willingness to really hone that aspect of their games--for Rubio as opposed to passing, for Bazzy, as opposed to dribble penetration. Bjelly loves to make the extra pass. I want to see him launch.

Rubio Shooting

Rubio's case illustrates how near and yet how far away one can be in the NBA. From his shooting stats both this year and over his career, if he could substitute just one made shot for one missed shot per game, then his overall shooting percentage would be around 48% rather than 36% (assuming the same number of attempts). Then the question would be why doesn't he shoot more.

The facts are he doesn't make

The facts are he doesn't make one more shot and he shoots in the mid 30's and is bad finishing at the rim. He is a total team player who seems to be a great kid. There is a lot to like about him but does he fit Towns and Wiggins is the question??

Rubio

He does everythign else so well that I think you have to give him more of an opportunity to fix his shot. As you point out, one more made basket per game increases his shooting percentage by quite a bit. So one might think that by just learning how to finish shots at the rim better, he may be able to do that.

I feel that part of the reason he doesnt finish well is that he is still not strong enough. He's been in the league now 5 years (I believe) and still has NOT put on what I'd call a great NBA body. I am a big proponent of him NOT playing Euro ball in the summer and working on things that will help him more on THIS side of the pond. I was encouraged that he stayed home this last summer but was disappointed that it didnt result in a better shooting OR more muscle.

I am a "Rubiobo" but I think its time for him to step up and put in even more work towards guaranteeing hes part of our long term future.

The draft

This is the problem that results from a policy allowing bad teams to draft first. That means the best players are stuck in franchises for the first couple of years of their career where they have little chance to develop. The NBA needs to develop a system that gives bad teams a skin in the game, that punishes them for performing poorly. Taking away their first draft picks is a start.

chain reaction

Hiram--

How would you suggest a really bad team that isn't tanking improve itself without any first round picks?

Have you noticed that every major team sport allows bad teams to draft first? Do you seriously recommend either no draft or a system where the good teams get the best players and then the others get the leftovers?

In other words, please give me steps 2, 3 and 4 of this brilliant plan.

How would you suggest a

How would you suggest a really bad team that isn't tanking improve itself without any first round picks?

It would be up to them to find a way. Presumably, they would hire better managers. It may also hope to force bad owners out of the league The fact is, historically bad teams like the T Wolves, despite all the high draft choices, have not been able to improve the team. The problem is that traditionally bad teams don't serve their players, their fans, or the league well. There has to be a way to break this cycle.

Have you noticed that every major team sport allows bad teams to draft first?

I have. That the bad teams should be allowed to draft first is a widespread assumption that has gone almost entirely unexamined. Nobody asks the obvious question, "why should we reward bad teams for being bad?"

What I like is the soccer league promotion and relegation model adopted everywhere except in the United States. In soccer the system of incentives aligns the interests of the owners with the interests of the fans. On one end, winning is extremely lucrative. On the other end, relegation is financially catastrophic. You don't have teams tanking, and you don't have ghost teams like the T Wolves who do little more than provide the real teams somebody to play until the playoffs start.

Do you seriously recommend either no draft or a system where the good teams get the best players and then the others get the leftovers?

That goes to some different issues. I am a draft skeptic, actually. I think drafts are a conspiracy in restraint of trade that allows owners of teams to drive down labor costs, but that goes to a different set of issues. What I do suggest is that the leagues have fewer draft rounds, allowing undrafted players to more easily flow to teams that really need them

Credible answers

Frankly, this is a more intelligent response than I expected. I don't agree with most of it, but it is a cohesive and philosophically consistent viewpoint.
I think we should "reward teams for being bad" to create parity in competition among teams, so that we don't have a situation like the Celtics or Yankees of yore, winning the majority of championships over a 20-year span. I grant you that some organizations like the Kings and Wolves have managed to turn this lemonade into lemons via bad decisions, but I am not sure organized sports in this country can accommodate the radical measures you espouse to alter that formula.
For example, relegation would indeed be financially catatastophic for the Wolves, if, say, they suddenly became a D-League franchise due to their NBA ineptitude. And perhaps the Mad Ants could make some hay in the NBA if they learned how to excel at the D-League level. Actually, more realistically, we would have a return to the old CBA days, where teams weren't directly affiliated with the NBA and the purpose was more interleague competition than player development.
But even so, I can't imagine these CBA franchises in relatively minor markets being able to accommodate the demands of the NBA if they were promoted to the big time through relegation. And if they did manage to ramp up their operation only to not be able to keep up and thus become relegated back downward after a year or two or three, it would be financially devastating probably to the community as well as the owners.
Even so, good answer.

It's worse then the Yankees and the Celtics

Unfortunately, the soccer model in Europe does not lead to good competition. On a national level, in the leagues in Spain, Italy, Germany, England, and France, the same teams win for decades. they have no draft, and invest in players at age 12 or before. There is no free university development system as in the USA. Even in countries with smaller leagues, the result is the same: the big teams joust every year for the titles and rewards. Then across Europe, the best teams from each country are thrown together into a mini-season that makes for great soccer but very little competitive difference. And the problem is getting worse. If the NBA had two tiers with a relegation and promotion system as in soccer in Europe, there would be a clot of a half-dozen super teams at the top of the first tier, and a clot of poorly-run teams, including the Wolves, at the bottom of the second tier. The refusal of the Wolves to puchase and operate their own D franchise can be taken as proof of this. There is a significant trend in Europe that suggests this could change, as deep-pocket investors chase huge TV money and buy relatively cheap franchises to get into the game. So an astute investor could buy the Wolves, start developing its own young players in a pro version of the AAU set-up, and pay enough for stars to shoot to the top of that first tier. As it is now, more than half of all the teams in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy have no chance of winning the titles or qualifying for the lucrative mini-season of champions league, and the situation is only marginally better in England. But the TV money is so obscene that just staying in the 20-team top tier in England is hugely profitable: of all the highest-earning 30 soccer teams in the world, 20 of these are the members of the English first division. That's TV money. The wild card here is expansion into Europe and Asia. If the real money to be made was not in winning the NBA finals, but qualifying for a second circuit of more lucrative play against European and Asian teams (many of them featuring U.S. players), the incentive to win becomes more greatly pronounced and also more unpredictable. The great fascination with soccer in Europe is that second circuit: imagine if only four NBA teams qualified to play in that second circuit of games against European and Asian teams, and winning that competition would yield a $100-million payout to the team. And the key would be not the four best as determined by the playoffs but by the season, rewarding the long hike through 80 games instead of the finishing sprint of the postseason. So the Wolves would have a regular season in the first tier, the NBA playoffs, and a 12- or 16-team season that is more lucrative than the former two competitions, if they could stay in the first tier and win. Investors in New York and Los Angeles and Chicago would dominate this participation if the European model is an example. Madrid, London, Paris, Rome, Milan, Barcelona, Munich, Liverpool and Manchester are the perpetual addresses of the European winners, and there are only a few Green Bays: Juventus of Turin in Italy comes to mind, or Sevilla of Spain. The biggest cities win by long-term investing. Mr. Taylor is lucky that he is in the roulette system of the NBA and stands to make hundreds of millions of dollars by continuing to short the franchise he was astute enough to buy at a time when he could afford it.

Soccer

There is a lot there.

First, the fact that the wealthiest usually win is, sadly, in the nature of competition. Poor teams don't win the Premier League championship, just as poor individuals don't get elected president. Donald Trump isn't in our living rooms every night because of his insights into American policy, he is there because he is rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and it's his wealth that makes him competitive.

As it is, the Premier League is very competitive. Teams up and down the table have something to compete for it just isn't the championship, at least not for most of them.

With respect to the college stuff, that is such a big subject, it requires it's own thread. Suffice it to say, no one is really sure why American universities need and are expected to support semi professional sports franchises, but for some reason they do.

" If the NBA had two tiers with a relegation and promotion system as in soccer in Europe, there would be a clot of a half-dozen super teams at the top of the first tier, and a clot of poorly-run teams, including the Wolves, at the bottom of the second tier."

That really describes the status quo in the NBA. An advantage of promotion is that it moves out the dead wood and gives new teams a try. Now the reality is, most promoted teams are relegated within a year or two, but there is the occasional great story like Leicester, promoted and nearly relegated last year, and now leading the league deep in the season.

". But the TV money is so obscene that just staying in the 20-team top tier in England is hugely profitable: of all the highest-earning 30 soccer teams in the world, 20 of these are the members of the English first division"

Generally speaking, there is no similar financial incentive in American pro leagues. Teams are indeed desperate to say in the Premiere League which gives them an incredible competitive edge. And at the top of the league, teams are desperate for the financial benefits of playing in Europe the next year issues talked about in the posting.

But let's get real. We won't see competition in American sports the way we see it in soccer. London supports about 20 professional soccer teams. New York supports only two NFL franchisees, and for the moment at least, Los Angeles supports none, and hasn't for a couple of decades. But just because we don't have the amount of competition that results from multiple competitive leagues, doesn't mean we can't choose to favor measures that encourage rather than discourages competition, that links the fortunes of teams to the need to compete successfully in each and every game to which the teams charge a very high ticket price.